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1.0. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Zoonoses in Livestock in Kenya (ZooLinK) is a project that seeks to enable Kenya develop 
an effective surveillance programme for zoonotic diseases (infectious diseases transmissible 
between animals and human beings). The surveillance programme will be integrated across both 
human and animal health sectors. To achieve this goal the project will work in close 
collaboration with Kenyan government departments in responsible for animal and human health. 
As a prelude to the start of the project, an evaluation of the existing surveillance systems for 
human and animal health was carried out. The evaluation focused on the national surveillance 
system and the systems at the western part of Kenya (Busia county, Kakamega county and 
Bungoma county) where the initial programme will be developed. 
In conducting the evaluation the investigators used key informant interviews, focused group 
discussion participant questionnaires, audio recordings and observation for data collection. Data 
analysis for the qualitative data focused on generating themes or theory around the responses 
obtained in the key informants interviews and focused group discussions. Univariate analysis 
was performed by use of simple proportions in calculation for surveillance system attributes like 
sensitivity, completeness, PVP and Timeliness for the human health surveillance systems. 
The findings of the evaluation revealed that there was poor linkage between animal health 
surveillance and the human health surveillance systems. None of the systems had surveillance 
structures dedicated to zoonotic diseases. Most practitioners used clinical signs for diagnosis of 
diseases with little reference to acceptable case definitions. Laboratory diagnosis in animal 
health services focused more on suspected notifiable diseases as opposed to being a standard 
operating procedure for diagnosis. In Human health services the health care facilities that had 
laboratory within the facility conducted laboratory diagnosis for cases referred by the clinicians. 
However, some clinicians preferred using clinical signs for diagnosis to avoid the wait or turn-a-
round time in the laboratory. 
For effective surveillance of zoonoses to be realized it would be advisable to establish 
surveillance structures specific to zoonoses and the necessary resources allocated to the 
surveillance activities. In addition, an integrated approach that incorporated both human and 
animal disease surveillance should be employed in the surveillance of zoonoses.  
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2.0. INTRODUCTION 
Public health surveillance is the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and 
dissemination of data about a health-related event for use in public health action to reduce 
morbidity and mortality and to improve health. The functions of Public Health Surveillance 
include supporting case detection and public health interventions, estimating the impact of a 
disease or injury, portraying the natural history of a health condition, determining the distribution 
and spread of illness, generating hypotheses and stimulating research, evaluating prevention and 
control measures, facilitating planning and outbreak detection (CDC, 2001; WHO, 2006)  
Recent global pandemics of emerging and re-emerging diseases like Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, 
Respiratory Viruses and others underscore the importance of effective surveillance and response 
systems world over. Threats of bioterrorism to global health security and economic stability have 
also revolutionized the role of surveillance among global communities. The International Health 
Regulations (IHR) 2005 underlines the importance of surveillance systems and requests 
commitment from all Member States to establish and implement effective surveillance and 
response systems to detect and contain public health threats of national and international 
importance (WHO, 2006)  
Surveillance for zoonotic diseases in Kenya is conducted in separate departments in various 
Ministries including Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Agriculture Livestock and Fisheries 
(MALF) and the Ministry of Kenya Wildlife Services Kenya established a One Health (OH) 
Office called Zoonotic Disease Unit (ZDU) in 2011 whose mandate is to focus on zoonotic 
diseases and effectively link human and animal health experts. The ZDU is charged with the 
mission of establishing and maintaining active collaboration at the animal, human and ecosystem 
interface towards better prevention and control of zoonotic diseases. The ZDU is a unit that is 
directly linked and dependent upon the Ministry of Health (MOH) and Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Fisheries (MALF) for leadership and financial support (ZDU Kenya, 2012)  
There is limited information available on assessment conducted on the existing surveillance 
platforms to determine if they are adequately meeting the objectives for which they were formed. 
The Current Surveillance systems do not capture adequate information on zoonotic events and 
where the information available, the quality is low since Surveillance for zoonoses is largely 
health facility based in the human sector, participatory surveillance in animal health sector is 
weak and both sectors receive minimal reports from private practitioners. The existing 
surveillance systems operate separate databases which are not linked in any way, thereby 
fragmenting information on zoonotic diseases into several pieces managed by different bodies.  
Devolution of Animal and Human health services to the counties as per the Kenyan Constitution 
promulgated in 2010 has brought new dimensions and impact that should be considered in 
disease monitoring and management systems in both human and livestock sectors. Moreover, a 
situation analysis to determine the existing opportunities for design and introduction of an 
integrated surveillance system for zoonotic disease is lacking.  
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We undertook an evaluation exercise targeting the current surveillance systems in human, 
livestock and wildlife health services relevant to zoonotic disease surveillance in Kenya with 
specific focus on three counties in Western Kenya to provide specific recommendations for 
improvement of zoonotic disease surveillance and suggest opportunities for design and 
deployment of integrated human-livestock surveillance system 
 
3.0. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
 
3.1 Project background, goals and objectives 
The ZooLink project is a project that seeks to focus on surveillance of zoonosis in livestock in 
Kenya with the initial focus on Western Kenya. The driving force behind the project is the fact 
that the presence and burden of zoonoses is greatly underestimated in Kenya just like in other 
developing countries. The risk of zoonoses and other infectious diseases has been increased by 
the far reaching changes in the agricultural sector, with major changes in livestock production 
systems like commercialization and intensification in order to satisfy increased demand for 
livestock products (The FAO-OIE-WHO Collaboration, 2010; ZED Group, 2015) 
The goal of ZooLinK is to enable Kenya to develop an effective disease surveillance programme 
for zoonoses (infectious diseases that are transmissible between human beings and the lower 
vertebrates and are  acquired through contact with animals or their products), which is, by 
design, integrated across both human and animal health sectors. To achieve this goal the project 
implementers will work in close collaboration with Kenyan government departments responsible 
for animal health and human health in western Kenya and the model developed for western 
Kenya will be used for a national programme  (WHO, 2016; ZED Group, 2015) 
The major objectives of the project are to estimate the current zoonotic disease and to understand 
how it will evolve in to the future (ZED Group, 2015) 
3.2 Purpose of the evaluation 
In order to come up with a surveillance system for the zoonoses the existing system need to be 
identified and their effectiveness in addressing zoonoses surveillance determined. There is little 
information available on the evaluation of the existing disease surveillance systems in Kenya. 
The evaluation exercise was to provide baseline information needed to inform disease 
surveillance stakeholders on various aspects of the systems currently in use in the country. It also 
sought to identify the gaps in the system and provide recommendation for improvement. 
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4.0. EVALUATION METHODS 
A descriptive study of the surveillance systems for Human, Livestock and Wildlife Health was 
undertaken. Multistage Sampling Technique was used at each level of surveillance to select 
respondents: National (MOH and MALF), County (Busia, Bungoma and Kakamega Counties), 
Sub County, Health Facility (County Referral Hospitals in Busia, Bungoma and Kakamega) and 
Community Levels. Within each level, selection of the study sites and subjects was done by 
simple random sampling technique. Purposeful selection of respondents was applied to sample 
the surveillance unit heads data managers at national level and the three counties; Busia, 
Kakamega and Bungoma. These were selected based on their location in the study site where the 
upcoming project ‘Zoonosis in Livestock in Kenya’ (ZooLinK) will be implemented.  
The comprehensive framework developed by the CDC and detailed in the ‘Updated Guidelines 
for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems’ was used in the evaluation (CDC, 2001). The 
scope of the evaluation included; 
• National and County surveillance and reporting systems for zoonotic diseases 
• Stakeholder networks (minimal) 
• Databases that houses reporting data or reporting systems 
• Objectives of the identified systems 
• Legal provisions, administrative mechanisms, data collection and reporting structure 
• Components of the individual surveillance systems and resource requirements 
• Special attributes of the surveillance systems 
• Attitudes and perceptions regarding zoonotic disease surveillance 
• Effect of devolution on zoonotic disease surveillance and  
• Proposals on the design and deployment of an integrated human-livestock surveillance 
system 
Where possible, assessment of the qualitative attributes like sensitivity, predictive value positive 
(PVP), timeliness and completeness were done by analysis of available data in the surveillance 
databases and review of records held in other parallel reporting systems e.g. the laboratory 
records. Qualitative system attributes like usefulness, acceptability, flexibility, simplicity, system 
integration & interoperability, data security and confidentiality were assessed through informant 
interviews and questionnaires administered to key people at the national and county levels. 
Attitudes and perceptions regarding zoonotic disease surveillance, effect of devolution on 
surveillance and the proposed designs for the integrated surveillance system were assessed by 
use of focused group discussions. 
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4.1 Data collection methods 
The data collection methods used in the evaluation exercise included Key Informant Interviews, 
Focused Group Discussions, participant questionnaires and observation. Audio recording was 
used during the KII and the FGD’s. 
4.2 Data sources   
Data for the evaluation exercises was sourced from health registers, laboratory register, 
Surveillance reports (weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual), records, questionnaires, 
interviews and the discussions with selected groups.  
4.3 Description of respondents 
At the national level the respondents included officers who were in charge of the day to day 
operations of the surveillance activities and those responsible for management of the 
computerized surveillance system. We used KII’s to get information from the officers. Among 
those interviewed included the heads of disease surveillance at the VEEU, KWS, NTD’s, IDSR, 
HMIS, VPH&AP, NPHLS and ZDU. 
At the county level the KII was used to get information from the county heads of human health, 
county heads of veterinary services and the county heads of disease surveillance of Kakamega, 
Bungoma and Busia. Participant questionnaires were administered to the sub county heads of 
veterinary services, sub county health information records officers, health facilities in-charges 
and sub county diseases surveillance officers. The FGD participants were drawn from different 
cadres in the departments of health and veterinary services at the county level. The participants 
included the frontline staff in veterinary services like the AHA’s, Meat Inspectors, veterinary 
officers and records officers from the department of veterinary at the county level. Participants 
from human health services included CHEW’s, CHV’s, health records officers, nurses, clinical 
officers 
4.4 Data processing technique  
For the qualitative data the methods focused on generating themes or theory around the 
responses obtained in the key informants interviews and focused group discussions. Univariate 
analysis was performed by use of simple proportions in calculation for surveillance system 
attributes like sensitivity, completeness, PVP and Timeliness.  
4.5 Data limitation  
Most of the records obtained from the animal diseases surveillance system focused more on 
counts and condemnation figures from the slaughter houses and slabs.  
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5.0. RESULTS - Key Informant Interviews and Observations 
5.1 Human Health Disease Surveillance Systems 
Ministry of Health (MOH) in Kenya conducts surveillance activities on zoonotic diseases 
spanning at least 4 different units; Health Management Information System (HMIS), Disease 
Surveillance and Response Unit (DSRU), Division of National Public Health Laboratory 
(NPHLS) and the Neglected Tropical Disease Unit (NTDU). All these units run parallel systems 
of surveillance which are not interlinked, although some data sources are shared in some 
instances. 
5.1.1 DISTRICT	HEALTH	INFORMATION	SOFWARE	2	(DHIS	2)	
Health Management Information System Unit (HMIS) is the main unit in MOH under the 
division of Monitoring & Evaluation, Health Research, Development and Health Informatics that 
is charged with the responsibility of capturing routine health data in one place, conduct quick 
analysis and disseminate health data to those who need to know. By the virtue of conducting 
routine data collection, this unit receives analyses and disseminates some surveillance data which 
also encompass some priority zoonotic diseases. The unit captures health data on the District 
Health Information Software (DHIS 2) version 2.2.0 which is freely available online portal 
where data is entered and accessed by users at lower levels of the health system. 
5.1.1.1 Surveillance	system	Description	
HMIS majorly focusses on passive surveillance encompassing a range of human diseases and 
conditions which are mainly reported through the MOH registers: MOH 705 A & B (Outpatient 
registers), MOH 505 (IDSR Weekly Epidemic Monitoring Forms). The priority Zoonotic 
Diseases included under surveillance by HMIS captured in MOH 705 are; Viral Hemorrhagic 
Fever (Group), Yellow Fever, Plague, Influenza Group, Brucellosis, Salmonellosis (Typhoid 
fever), Animal bites, Leishmaniasis, Schistosomiasis (Bilharzia). The rest would be lumped 
under ‘All other diseases’ which are also reportable in the same registers. The MOH 505 
captures data on Anthrax, Dengue, Rabies, Rift Valley Fever, Typhoid, Viral Hemorrhagic Fever 
(VHF), Sever Acute Respiratory Illness (SARI Clusters), Yellow Fever and ‘Others’. 
The main objectives of collection of surveillance data through DHIS 2 are to; 
• Capture routine data in one place 
• Help conduct quick analysis to generate standard ad dynamic reports 
• Help disseminate information to health stakeholders 
5.1.1.2 Legal	Authority/Legislation	
Several policies and legislations govern this system of surveillance in Kenya. The Health 
Information System Policy specifies the what, who and when to report health data. The 
constitution of Kenya of 2010 specifies the right to information for all citizens. The Kenya 
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Vision 2030 has health as one of the social pillars and the Kenya Health Policy Framework 
2012-2030 specify health information as one of the key pillars of achievement of health goals in 
Vision 2030. The Kenya Health Sector Strategic Plan of 2012-2018 presents key health sector 
strategies and priorities among which Health information. The current Health Bill which is still 
under discussion in parliament specifies health information as a key right. Several other local and 
international statues are also referred to in the management of Health information by the HMIS 
5.1.1.3 Administrative	structure	
HMIS is organized in 5 levels based on the health administrative structures of MOH as shown 
below. There are currently plans to include ward level in the structure in line with devolution. 
5.1.1.4 Description	of	the	major	components	of	DHIS	2	
The total population under surveillance (from which health data on priority zoonotic diseases is 
collected) is the whole population of Kenya (>45 million). Data is collected and sent passively 
on daily basis (e.g. maternal deaths), weekly (e.g Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response 
data), Monthly (for most other indicators including MOH 705) and quarterly (on staff returns, 
financial returns etc).The system collects data which is either aggregated data (e.g Counts of 
cases of brucellosis in a month), case-based data (e.g HIV cohort based data/follow up data) and 
annual data (e.g population projections) for the various units. 
The major sources of the data collected under DHIS 2 is routine health data generated at the 
community or health facility data and captured in primary health registers enumerated with 
Ministry of Health numbers e.g MOH 105, 513,514 etc which are later summarized and 
aggregated into MOH summary/reporting tools e.g. MOH 705 A & B, MOH 515 etc. Data that 
feeds into these registers is generated from outpatient and inpatient departments, laboratories, 
and immunization clinics among others. Baseline data is provided by national census or survey 
data. 
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Community Level
Health Facility Level
Sub County Level 
Structures
County Level Structures
National Level
Ministry of Health Surveillance Structures
Health Management Information System (DHIS 2)-
Online platform where data can be visualised and 
can be edited by specific staff at HMIS 
County Health Records Officer (CHRIO): Online 
helath data in DHIS 2 portal can be viewed and 
edited by CHRIO
Sub County Health Records Officer (SCHRIO): 
Health Data for the Sub County is recieved and 
upload online to DHIS 2. SCHRIO can also edit 
district and health facility data
Health Facility Data Clerks: Health facility and 
community data is summarised and recorded in 
MOH705. Some data clerks are able to upload and 
edit health facility data to DHIS 2 online. 
Community Based Health Information System- CBHIS: CHEWs 
and CHWs recieve and record health data from the village 
level in MOH 513, 514 and report using MOH 515
Data is transferred via a hybrid system: Manual transfer through hard copy reports which are 
prepared and handed over to the Sub County Health Records Officer (SCHRIO) who in turn files 
the copies and electronically directly through Electronic Medical Records Systems in some 
health facilities and via DHIS 2 for some facilities.  
Data which has been uploaded into DHIS 2 is stored electronically and backed up daily to cloud 
and online repositories. The main server for the system is located at the University of Nairobi but 
the backups are located in other different locations. 
Data analysis is routine and is expected to be carried out at all the 5 levels by officers working at 
those levels for example the Community Health Volunteers (CHVs), Community Health 
Extension Workers (CHEWS), Data clerks, SCHRIO and CHRIO among other users. Any other 
user with login credentials can also log in and access data at any of these levels and visualize, 
download and analyze the data. Data analysis is mainly done monthly, quarterly or annually for 
consumption by various users at different levels, depending on need and ability. There is no 
specific data analysis software but the system has online data analysis tools e.g. dashboard 
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tables, pivot tables, data visualizers, GIS, event visualizers and standard reports based on fixed 
templates. 
Following data analysis, dissemination to stakeholders is done at all levels also based on need. 
The HMIS unit prepares and shares trends reports with national level stakeholders periodically 
and the unit also prepares and disseminates quarterly bulletins which are shared with various 
stakeholders at all levels. 
5.1.1.5 Resources	needed	to	operate	the	system	
DHIS 2 is majorly funded by Health Ministry and health partners like USAID/APHIA Info, 
World Bank and DANIDA. Personnel supported by the Health Ministry are deployed at the 
national level to support DHIS 2 as per the table below; 
 Cadre No Present 
(Technical) 
Requirement/optimum 
1 Epidemiologists 1 3 
2 Demographers 0 2 
3 Statisticians 0 4 
4 Health Information Managers 3 8 
5 Public Health Specialists 1 4 
6 ICT Specialists 0 4 
7 Data Clerks 0 12 
 Total 5 37 
In terms of physical infrastructure, the HMIS unit has an office space, few computers for the 
officers, a computer server, have a shared means of transport, electricity and internet. Stationery 
is provided for the unit based on availability of a budget for the same. The following grid 
provides a summary of the other direct costs incurred in HMIS to maintain DHIS 2; 
 Vote Estimated Cost Frequency Total 
1 Initial Training 12,000,000 1 12,000,000 
2 Refresher/Follow up training 5,000,000 1 5,000,000 
3 Mail/Courier 0 - 0 
4 Transport 30,000 12 360,000 
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5 Internet 8,000 12 96,000 
6 Electricity Shared - - 
7 Airtime 0(Not allocated) - 0 
8 Stationery Shared   
9 System Maintenance 2,000,000 1 2,000,000 
10 Server fees 36,000 1 36,000 
 Total    
 
5.1.1.6 Digital/Computerized	surveillance	tools	
DHIS 2 is an online digital platform that lets you manage aggregate data with a flexible data 
model. It was developed by the University of Oslo and is a free/open source software that can 
enable the user to set up data elements data entry forms, validation rules, indicators and reports 
in order to create a fully-fledged system for data management. DHIS 2 2 has advanced features 
for data visualization, like GIS, charts, pivot tables and dashboards which lets the user explore 
and bring meaning to health data. It is currently used to store and aggregate health data for 
Kenya and is managed by MOH staff in collaboration with partners from APHIA Info and 
University of Nairobi. The online is fully operational more than 99% of the time and availability 
is affected by local network connection.  
5.1.1.7 DHIS	2	System	Attributes	
Data Quality: DHIS 2 has varied system quality checks in place to ensure that the system is 
working optimally. This system can enable the users to capture aggregate data on a variety of 
devices and also allows users to enter, use and access data both online and offline. During 
network downtime, the data entered is captured locally in the browser and can then be uploaded 
to the online server when connectivity is back. The system can enable users to generate unique 
data entry forms based on data model and need, define auto-calculated fields inside the forms, 
enable and employ logical validation rules and system checks and also set minimum and 
maximum values to improve data quality. The system has capabilities to flag off out of range 
data and pin point areas with suspicious data or inconsistent data by employing data marks and 
means e.g. a case of anthrax or polio reported in  DHIS 2 is able to trigger and  generate a system 
flag. 
System integration and interoperability: DHIS 2 is able to integrate with other computerized 
systems. It has great capabilities for data exchange and comes with its own format for meta-data 
and data exchange. Most parts of the system can be accessed through the extensive REST-based 
web API, making it synchronize with third party clients like Android applications, web portals 
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and other information systems including the newly deployed m-SOS system. It is even possible 
to set up scheduled integration jobs in order to periodically import and synchronize with data 
from other open source systems. Unfortunately, most of these capabilities have not been fully 
exploited in the DHIS 2 version in current use in Kenya. 
Data Security: Security of stored data in DHIS2 is ensured through a compound layer of safety 
features. All users of DHIS2 have credentials and user rights that are assigned at different levels 
and with varied levels of capabilities so as to improve safety. Only registered users with emails 
are able to view data which has been uploaded and only users with varied levels of user rights 
and authorizations are able to key in new data and even edit data sets in DHIS2. Additionally, the 
data in this system is encrypted so as to improve online safety and integrity. 
Confidentiality: DHIS2 in its current form ensures confidentiality by capturing only health 
events as opposed to patients. The system is able to be configured to code and hide any piece of 
information that may compromise confidentiality of patients online. The consent to capture and 
display health data in DHIS is one that is implied in the various health policies and statutes like 
the Kenya Constitution 2010 and Kenya Health Information System Policy among others. 
Timeliness and Completeness: DHIS2 is relatively timely and complete, but this varies from 
dataset to dataset, county to county, month to month or between different years. The grid below 
provides a snapshot of timeliness and completeness over time, calculated on the basis of 
complete dataset registrations received by the 15th day of the month; 
% Completeness and Timeliness for the year 2014 (Jan-Dec), Outpatient Summary <5 years 
Region Actual 
Reports 
Expected 
Reports 
Completeness% Reports on 
Time 
Timeliness 
% 
Bungoma 1621 1884 86.0 1505 79.9 
Busia 979 1068 91.7 865 61.0 
Kakamega 2499 2808 89.0 2047 72.9 
Kenya 75908 89760 84.6 67255 74.9 
% Completeness and Timeliness for Q3 2015 (July-Sept 2015), Outpatient Summary >5 years 
Region Actual 
Reports 
Expected 
Reports 
Completeness% Reports on 
Time 
Timeliness 
% 
Bungoma 448 471 95.1 423 89.8 
Busia 258 270 95.6 238 88.1 
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Kakamega 680 705 96.5 645 91.5 
Kenya 20646 22359 92.3 18653 83.4 
% Completeness and Timeliness for 2012, Outpatient Summary <5 years 
Region Actual 
Reports 
Expected 
Reports 
Completeness% Reports on 
Time 
Timeliness 
% 
Bungoma 1435 1884 76.2 1391 73.8 
Busia 860 1068 80.5 771 72.2 
Kakamega 2129 2808 75.8 1964 69.9 
Kenya 67338 89760 75.0 59813 66.6 
% Completeness and Timeliness for Q3 2012 (July-Sept 2012), Outpatient Summary >5 years 
Region Actual 
Reports 
Expected 
Reports 
Completeness% Reports on 
Time 
Timeliness 
% 
Bungoma 364 471 77.3 363 77.1 
Busia 225 270 83.3 220 81.5 
Kakamega 544 705 77.2 537 76.2 
Kenya 17414 22359 77.9 16139 72.2 
Usefulness/Acceptability: DHIS2 is useful to the users. The system is able to provide estimates 
of the magnitude of morbidity and mortality related to the health events under surveillance e.g. 
users are able to compute the total number of cases of a disease or the mortality rates in the 
population. Depending on periods of data entry, the system is also able to depict trends that may 
signal changes in the occurrence of disease, injury or adverse or protective exposure in the 
population under surveillance including detection of epidemics. Through analysis of such trends, 
users are also able to assess the effect of prevention and control programs. DHIS2 has a 
dedicated research unit that periodically translates the information obtained from the data to 
research. This has in instances lead to change in practice or improved behavioral, social and 
policy environment. DHIS2 indicators are always employed as a measure of true performance in 
health sector indicators. Acceptability of DHIS2 is very high, judging from the high participation 
rate of different units and agencies in reporting through this system. 
Simplicity: DHIS2 system is quite simple in its design and user friendly. With little teaching, 
users are able to mine data in formats that are convenient and understandable to them. DHIS 2 
allows users to explore and understand data through great visualization features. It can enable 
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one to get the complete overview through the pivot table feature, spot trends in data with 
charting and visualize geographical data aspects using the GIS functionality. These analytics are 
so easy to use that anyone can take advantage of it.  
The system is based on simple and intuitive principles and enables one to create analysis from 
live data in seconds. DHIS 2 is completely web-based, making it simple to share your analysis 
with colleagues and stakeholders. The reporting structure is simplified as in most cases data 
flows from the health facility to the sub-County then online and is available to everyone to view 
while in some cases data is entered straight at the point of generation (Health facility level). This 
is quite a simple design which avoids all the bureaucracies in long reporting formats. Case 
definitions are available and are straight forward. 
Flexibility/Adaptability/Scalability: DHIS2 is extremely dynamic and flexible. With devolution 
of health services, it has been possible to restructure the administrative units from the previous 8 
provinces to 47 counties seamlessly, and even to use a hybrid of the two. There are plans 
underway to introduce a new administrative unit (Wards) into the system in line with the new 
governing structures. DHIS 2 you can have thousands of concurrent users and hundreds of 
millions of data records using only a single, standard web-server.  
DHIS 2 is currently being used as national health information systems in a large number of 
countries and has thousands of days in production leading up to a high-performing and mature 
system. The only setback to this feature is somewhat restrictive policies in the silo approach 
adopted by various government units involved in surveillance. DHIS 2 is also able to provide a 
range of mobile solutions based on short message system (SMS), plain HTML and Java for 
feature phones, and a high-end Web-based solution with offline support for smartphones. This is 
what has enable the HMIS unit to recently launch the m-SOS product which is a mobile based 
SMS reporting system being piloted in Kenya. 
Sensitivity and Predictive Value Positive: On a monthly basis (aggregate reporting), users are 
able to analyze health data to permit accurate diagnosis or identification, prevention or treatment, 
and handling of contacts when appropriate. However, this capability is limited to weekly, 
monthly, quarterly or annually depending on the frequency of data entry. As such the system 
may not be sensitive in picking up acute outbreaks of diseases that may need urgent 
interventions.  
On a case based reporting level, sensitivity (Sn) and predictive value positive (PVP) was 
measured by calculating average proportion of cases of 3 zoonotic diseases (Brucellosis, 
Salmonellosis, and Bacillary Dysentery) detected by DHIS2 compared to the number actually 
tested in the laboratory against the standard case definition of these conditions. Sn and PVP was 
found to be low across board for the selected common zoonotic diseases for the month of April 
2015 against the convention laboratory tests in use as shown in the tables below: 
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Calculation of Sensitivity and Predictive Value Positive for Brucella Surveillance through 
DHIS2 reporting, Busia County Referral Hospital Data April 2015 
Detected by DHIS Brucella Present ( Rapid Serology by X-Pert 
TestR) 
Total 
Yes No 
Yes 1   3 4 
No 28 30 58 
Total 29 33 62 
Sn = 1/ (1+28)*100 = 3.45% 
PVP = 1/ (1+3)*100  = 25% 
Calculation of Sensitivity and Predictive Value Positive for Salmonella Surveillance through 
DHIS2 reporting, Bungoma County Referral Hospital Data April 2015 
Detected by DHIS Salmonella Present ( Rapid Serology by 
Antigen Strong StepR) 
Total 
Yes No 
Yes 100 74 174 
No 271 235 506 
Total 371 309 680 
Sn = 100/ (100+271)*100 = 26.95% 
PVP = 100/ (100+74)*100 = 57.47% 
Calculation of Sensitivity and Predictive Value Positive for Bacillary Dysentery Surveillance 
through DHIS2 reporting, Busia County Referral Hospital Data April 2015 
Detected by DHIS Bacillary Dysentery Present ( Stool 
Microscopy) 
Total 
Yes No 
Yes 1 4 5 
No 69 72 141 
 15 
 
Total 70 76 146 
Sn = 1/ (1+69)*100 = 1.43% 
PVP = 1/ (1+4)*100 = 20% 
5.1.2 INTEGRATED DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND RESPONSE (IDSR) 
Kenya adopted the IDSR strategy in 1998, conducted a surveillance and response capacity 
assessment in 2000 and began implementation in 2002. In line with the International Health 
Regulations of 2005, IDSR promotes rational use of resources by integrating and streamlining 
common surveillance activities of disease detection, reporting, analysis and interpretation, 
action/response feedback. IDSR also promotes rational use of resources by integrating and 
streamlining common surveillance activities. IDSR is a comprehensive strategy for capturing 
health information of communicable disease for prevention and control by linking community, 
health facility, sub-county, county and national levels. The MOH in Kenya undertakes integrated 
Diseases surveillance through the following platforms; 
• electronic IDSR (eIDSR)- launched in 2012,this is a web based system that captures 
surveillance information from the health facility level upwards. Currently, over 5000 
health facilities are reporting on this platform using smart phones and computers. 
• Mobile SMS Based Disease Outbreak Alert System (mSOS) - this is an outbreak alert 
system currently being piloted to be rolled out in future. Reporting is based on mobile 
phone SMS. This system was developed by Strathmore University in collaboration with 
JICA and the MOH. 
• DHIS2 
eIDSR is housed in the Division of Disease Surveillance and Epidemic Response (DSRU) in the 
Department of Preventive and Promotive Health. 
5.1.2.1 eIDSR System Description 
The major focus of eIDSR is passive human surveillance activities around communicable 
diseases in four categories i.e. Epidemic prone diseases, diseases targeted for eradication, 
diseases/events of public health importance and diseases or vents of international concern. The 
list of diseases under surveillance includes the following priority zoonotic diseases: Athrax, 
Dengue, Plague, Rabies, Typhoid, viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, Yellow Fever and Cluster of SARI 
which are reported weekly in MOH 505 and Animal bites, Brucellosis, Leishmaniasis, 
Schistosomiasis and Salmonellosis which are reported monthly in MOH 504. 
The main objectives of collection of surveillance data through eIDSR are to; 
• Strengthen capacity for effective surveillance 
 16 
 
• Integrate disease surveillance systems for efficiency 
• Improve use of surveillance information for decision making 
• Improve laboratory involvement in epidemic detection and confirmation 
• Increase involvement of clinicians in surveillance 
• Improve surveillance information flow in all levels of the  health care system 
• Emphasize community participation in surveillance (detection and response) 
• Trigger epidemiological investigations in detection, investigation and reporting of public 
health problems, and in the implementation of effective public health interventions 
• Fulfill international health obligations 
5.1.2.2 Legal Authority/Legislation 
Surveillance under eIDSR is manly guided by National Health Policy and the National IDSR 
technical guidelines. International statutes like the WHO policy on IDSR Strategy and the 
International Health regulations are also specify ways to prevent provide public health response 
to the international spread of diseases to avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic. 
5.1.2.3 Administrative Structure 
Surveillance under eIDSR is organized in 4 levels from the health facility level to the national 
level as shown below: 
5.1.2.4 Description of the major components of eIDSR 
The total population under surveillance (from which health data on priority zoonotic diseases is 
collected) is the whole population of Kenya (>45 million). Data is collection and reporting is 
done passively on; 
• immediate case based reporting in MOH 502 (Case based report form),  
• weekly basis in MOH 505 (IDSR Weekly Epidemic Monitoring Form),  
• Monthly in MOH 504 (Monthly Surveillance report form) 
eIDSR currently collects data aggregated data (e.g Counts of cases of brucellosis in a month), 
case-based data (e.g. line listing for polio or measles case) depending on the disease in question. 
The major sources of the data collected under eIDSR is routine health data from the health 
facility data and captured in primary health registers enumerated with Ministry of Health 
numbers e.g MOH 105, 502 & 503 and later aggregated into summary tools MOH 504 & 505. 
Data that feeds into these registers is generated from outpatient and inpatient departments, 
laboratories, and immunization clinics among others. 
 17 
 
Health Facility Level
Sub County Level 
Structures
County Level Structures
National Level
Ministry of Health Surveillance Structures
DSRU-
eIDSR platform data can be visualised and can be edited by 
specific staff at DSRU 
County Disease Surveillance Officer (CDSC): Surveillance 
data in eIDSR can be accessed and viewed and edited by the 
CDSC. Theere is horizontal communication with County 
Health Executive
Sub County Disease Surveillance Coordinator (SCDSC)-eISDR 
data is recieved  by SCDSC can also edit district and health 
facility data
Health Facility Surveillance Focal Personand recorded in 
MOH 502,503,504 & 505. Reports in 505 are sent by SMS to 
the SCDSC weekly, hard copies sent to the sub county level
Data is transferred via a hybrid system: Manual transfer through hard copy reports which are 
prepared and handed over to the Sub County Disease Surveillance coordinator (SCDSC) who in 
turn files the copies and electronically directly through Short Message System (SMS) from 
mobile phone devices/smart phones held by health facility surveillance focal persons. 
Once surveillance data has been sent by SMS and hard copies of MOH 505 to the sub-county 
level, the SCDSC transcribes this data and uploads it online to the eIDSR on a weekly basis. 
Monthly data is uploaded by the SCHRIO alongside other reports. Data is stored electronically in 
servers located at the National AIDS and STI Control Program (NASCOP) offices in Nairobi. 
Data is backed up in real time through cloud online system. 
Routinely, eIDSR data is expected to be analyzed weekly by the CDSC at the county level and 
the SCDSC at the sub-county level or any other officers conducting monitoring and evaluation. 
The DSRU publishes a bulletin (Weekly Epidemiological Bulletin) on a standard template and 
this report is hared widely among stakeholders through email. Ad hoc analysis is also possible on 
a monthly, quarterly and annual basis as may be needed. Parallel analysis of DHIS2 data is also 
conducted at the national level for comparison basis as a means of data validation. 
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5.1.2.5 Resources needed to operate eIDSR 
Personnel: eIDSR is mainly funded by health partners (WHO, JICA, CDC, Clinton Foundation) 
and the government of Kenya.  The MOH has currently deployed 4 staff to support eIDSR at the 
national level (ICT support, Data, Epidemiologist and Administrative support). In each of the 47 
counties, there is a County Disease Surveillance Coordinator (CDSC) working at the county 
level and Sub County Coordinators working at the sub county levels. In each health facility, 
there is a focal person (surveillance officer) responsible for surveillance work within the facility. 
The CHEWs and the CHVs perform surveillance roles in the community. 
Physical Infrastructure: The national eIDSR has an office space/desk equipped with a 
computer, 20 mobile phones, shared computer server housed at NASCOP, 3 vehicles for 
transport, supply of stationery, electricity and internet connectivity. The vehicles are shared 
across various departments and the internet connectivity is poor and erratic. 
Financing of eIDSR: It was not possible to get information on the direct costs involved in 
running of eIDSR during the interview. 
A full description of the eIDSR and its SOPs are available in IDSR technical guidelines and 
DSRU Strategic Plan. 
5.1.2.6 Digital/Computerized surveillance tools 
The whole eIDSR system is fully computerized nationwide. Surveillance focal persons at lower 
level health facilities are able to send surveillance data through mobile phone SMS on weekly 
basis to the SCDSC who in turn consolidates the reports for the sub-county and uploads the data 
to the eIDSR platform. Thereafter, the data is available online nationally on a weekly basis. 
Technically, eIDSR is managed by MOH staff at DSRU in conjunction with staff deployed by 
health partners e.g. Clinton Foundation. The eIDSR platform was developed by a contractor who 
was funded by JICA but is currently maintained by MOH staff in conjunction with other partner 
staff. The system is expected to be fully available and operational at all times but due to poor 
internet connectivity and erratic supply of electricity, it operates optimally about 75% of the 
time. 
5.1.2.7 Surveillance System Attributes 
Data Quality: eIDSR has in place varied quality checks to ensure optimal performance. 
Routinely, data validation exercises are carried out on the system to ensure the data that is 
captured is of good quality. Validation is done by checking for and cleaning out of range entries 
and data inconsistencies across board and also by comparison of data in eIDSR with other 
parallel reporting systems like DHIS2. Secondly, the eIDSR system is configured to generate 
prompts whenever an extraordinary or out of range data is keyed in. The prompts are generated 
both at the point of data entry and the national level. Staff who handle eIDSR are also trained 
regularly to ensure they are competent enough on system operations. 
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System Integration and interoperability: The eIDSR system is not integrated with any other 
parallel surveillance system. The system as it is structured is not able to integrate with other 
computerized systems (not interoperable). There is a strong push by the department to have fully 
integrated surveillance systems. There is need to carry out a thorough assessment on the role of 
e-surveillance in one health and harmonize existing policies on surveillance to enable 
integration. 
Data Security: Several safety features have been put in place to ensure the data captured in 
eIDSR is secure. Users of the system are issued with passwords which keep being updated. This 
restricted viewing is also enhanced by enabling users to have different levels of user capabilities 
once they are able to log onto the system. The server is protected with internet fire-walls meeting 
international standards and is located in a physically secure building with restricted entry. All 
electronic data is backed up with hard copies which are filed at the sub county levels. Electronic 
data is also backed up regularly through cloud computing to several other locations to protect 
against data loss. 
Confidentiality: Restricted viewing of eIDSR data through issuing users with passwords ensures 
that only authorized individuals have access to the data. The system mainly captures aggregate 
data that is used for reporting and a s such patient identifiers are excluded from the data sets. It is 
therefore not possible to link a particular case with an individual in the population. For case 
based reports e.g. MOH 502, unique identifiers are used to conceal the patient identity.  
Timeliness: The eIDSR system is not timely enough to detect acute outbreaks in the community. 
There usually a delay between the reporting levels and at times this leads to missing of cases. 
Therefore, the system cannot detect diseases or conditions in a timely way to permit accurate 
diagnosis or identification, prevention or treatment and handling of contacts. However, 
immediate reporting through MOH 502 and 503 can help the lower levels of health care system 
to pick out outbreaks and the community level.  
Usefulness: eIDSR is useful as it is able to provide estimates of the magnitude of morbidity and 
mortality related to the health event under surveillance. It can also detect trends that signal 
changes in the occurrence of disease and help detect potential epidemics e.g. increased diarrhea 
cases or malaria cases reported signaling an outbreak. The change in trends of reporting can also 
be used to assess the effect of prevention and control measures as is the case with measles or 
polio eradication program. Data from eIDSR is also able to stimulate research around the disease 
conditions under surveillance. 
Simplicity: eIDSR system is simple and user friendly. With only a modest training, users are able 
to access the system, upload data and access simple analysis of trends without difficulties. 
Flexibility/Adaptability/Scalability: The system is flexible enough and is easily adaptable. This 
was the case when health was devolved and structures for governance changed from the former 
provincial system to county system. It was easy to create data around the new administrative 
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units without problems and reporting was unaffected. The eIDSR platform is a multi-user 
platform and this enables it to be adapted to the needs of different users. The system is also 
highly scalable and can be extended to be used in new areas with only minimal adjustments and 
resources. 
5.1.3 LABORATORY SURVEILLANCE: THE NATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH 
LABORATORIES (NPHLS) 
5.1.3.1 Surveillance System Details 
NPHLS carries out routine surveillance covering the following; 
• Food handlers surveillance 
• Water quality surveillance 
• Laboratory Management Information System/LMIS (Reporting system) 
The first these areas of surveillance are not structured into organized systems but LMIS is a 
structured laboratory reporting system, mainly for laboratory workload and commodity 
reporting. All are passive and also involve a few zoonotic diseases among other conditions; 
Listeriosis, Diphylobothrium Latum, Escherichia Coli, Salmonellosis, Dengue, Brucellosis 
(Culture), Anthrax, Anti-microbial resistance, Campylobacteriosis, Avian Influenza and any 
other test that may be from time to time requested. 
The main objectives of this surveillance are to; 
• identify the organisms,  
• to detect changes in sensitivity patterns of micro-organisms 
• to support other health programs e.g. hospitals, food export companies, pharmacies 
5.1.3.2 Administrative structure and Legal Authority 
NPHLS derives its surveillance mandate from the National Health Policy which stipulates the 
roles of the laboratory in surveillance. The NPHLS is a division under the department of 
preventive and promotive health services and has several units under it; Reference Laboratories,  
TB/HIV reference laboratories, Biosafety unit, Parasitology unit, Microbiology unit, National 
blood transfusion services unit, Quality Assurance Unit and Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. 
Each unit carries out different surveillance roles depending on need. There are 6 regional 
reference laboratories in the country. All laboratories based in health facilities report through 
DHIS2 to the national level. 
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Health Facility Level
Sub County Level 
Structures
County Level Structures
National Level
Ministry of Health Surveillance Structures
NPHLS-
Several Units each charged with different surveillance role
County level Officers with user credentials e.g. CHRIO, 
CMLT, CDH can access and view data. CHRIO can also edit 
data for the specifc county
Sub County Health Records Officer (SCHRIO) recieved reports from 
health facilities and aggregates them and keys them onto DHIS
Health Facility Laboratories aggregate data from MOH 240 
and send forward reports in MOH 706 to the sub county 
level
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5.1.3.3 Major Components of Laboratory Surveillance 
NPHLS carries out surveillance for all the 47 counties, although currently, 3 counties have not 
been reporting. Data is collected and reported on a monthly basis from lower laboratories in 
health facilities. For food handlers and water surveillance, reporting is on a need basis. Reporting 
is based on both the counts (aggregate data) and case based data.  
Data is collected in MOH 204 register and then is aggregated in MOH 706 which is used for 
reporting. Hard copy data is sent to the sub county levels where the Sub County Health Records 
Officer (SCHRIO) or the Sub County Medical Laboratory Technologist (SCMLT) keys in the 
data to DHIS2. Data is then available online electronically through DHIS2. The county or 
national level officers with user credentials can access, view or even edit some of the data online. 
Data is analyzed by the Monitoring & Evaluation Department monthly or quarterly by use of 
various software e.g. Microsoft Excel, SPSS and shared to stakeholders who include ministry of 
health departments and health partners through emails, meetings, reports or bulletins. 
5.1.3.4 Resources needed to Operate Surveillance at NPHLS 
NPHLS receives funding for surveillance from donors including World Bank, CDC and other 
health partners. The Ministry of Health also funds surveillance activities in the laboratory 
although this is quite limited. In terms of personnel, there are no specific staff deployed to carry 
out surveillance in the units but the officers conduct surveillance among other duties they 
perform. There is no fully fledged surveillance unit or resources dedicated specifically for 
surveillance in the unit. The unit spends and estimated 6-10 million Kenya shillings annually on 
surveillance related activities. Because there is no unit purely to surveillance at NPHLS, there are 
no surveillance SOPS and no digital/computerized system dedicated to surveillance. 
5.1.3.5 Surveillance System Attributes 
Both water and food handler’s surveillance roles are not organized and therefore, their attributes 
were not evaluated. However, for the components reported through DHIS2, the attributes are 
same as DHIS2. 
5.1.4 SURVEILLANCE FOR ZOONOTIC DISEASES AT THE COUNTY LEVEL IN THE 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
5.1.4.1 Level of Assessment 
This assessment was carried out in 3 counties in Western Kenya: Busia, Bungoma and 
Kakamega Counties. Key informant interviews were administered to 4 respondents deployed at 
the county level: 2 County Health Directors and 2 County Disease Surveillance Coordinators. 
5.1.4.2 Surveillance System Details 
The major focus of surveillance identified in the four counties was human surveillance activities. 
All respondents identified eIDSR as the major system of surveillance in use at the counties. In 
Bungoma County, DHIS2 was also identified as an additional system of surveillance. All 
respondents agreed that the identified surveillance systems covered zoonotic diseases. All the 
 23 
 
respondents were able to identify common priority zoonotic disease under surveillance by 
eIDSR: Yellow Fever, Leptospirosis, Plague, Human African Trypanosomiasis, Ebola, 
Brucellosis, Anthrax, Salmonellosis and Rabies. However, other diseases included by some 
respondents included Schistosomiasis (50% of the respondents), Taeniosis (25%), Cryptococosis 
(25%), Marburg (25%), Aspergilosis (25%) and Rift Valley Fever (25%). 
5.1.4.3 Objectives of the identified surveillance system 
Varied responses were gotten on the objectives of the surveillance system identified (eIDSR). 
Some of the identified objectives included: 
• To detect disease outbreak 
• To monitor trends of diseases 
• To initiate early outbreak response 
• To monitor Disease Control interventions 
• To build human resource capacity 
• To collect health data 
• To communicate health information to stakeholders 
5.1.4.4 Legal Authority/Legislation 
All respondents identified the Public health Act Cap 242 and the International Health 
Regulations of 2005 as the important laws governing surveillance in these counties. However, 
the following statutes/laws were also identified by the respondents; 
• Kenya Constitution 2010 
• Kenya Health Bill (Pending) 
• County Health Bills (Pending) 
• Meat Control Act Cap 356 
• Food Drugs and Chemical substances Act Cap 254 
5.1.4.5 Administrative Structure 
The basic structure or surveillance was similar across all the tree counties. The basic unit of data 
collection was at the health facility and community levels wherein the health facility staff 
CHEWs and CHVs played a key role in data collection. Data is transmitted to the sub County 
level where the surveillance officer (SCDSC) uploads the data onto the eIDSR platform and also 
keeps a hard copy of the reports. This report is then available to be viewed nationally by the 
DSRU and at the county by the CDSC. The County Surveillance Coordinator (CDSC) shares 
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these reports with the County Director of Health (CDH) who in turn shares the information with 
the County Executive Committee Member for Health (CEC Health). In Kakamega County, the 
organogram is longer due to the inclusion of department of promotive health and county public 
health officer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.4.6 Description of the major Components of Surveillance at the County Level 
For all the 3 counties, the population under surveillance is the entire population of the county. In 
all the cases, data is collected weekly for eISDR and monthly for DHIS2. There are also diseases 
that are reported on immediate basis e.g. Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP). Reporting is either cases 
based (e.g. measles, AFP) or aggregate, depending on the condition. The source of data is the 
primary registers in the outpatient (MOH 705A & B), inpatient, laboratory (MOH 706) and 
Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Clinics. 
Data is transferred to the next level electronically via SMS (eIDSR) or manually via hard copy 
forms which are filed at the Sub County level. Data storage is by both electronic databases and 
manually by hard copy reports. In the three counties, data is analyzed regularly on weekly, 
monthly, quarterly, annually or on ad hoc basis as per the data needs. Various officers are 
responsible for data analysis, but key is the health records officers and the surveillance officers. 
There is no specific format of analysis, and simple counts and proportions are computed 
manually or in Microsoft Excel on agreed set of indicators. 
-Weekly Report Uploaded to 
eISDR Portal by SCDSC/SCHRIO 
-Monthly reports uploaded to 
DHIS2 by SCHRIO 
County Level: CDSC and CHRIO views eIDSR/DHIS2 
report for the county and shares reports with 
CHMT/CDH who reports to CEC 
Sub County Level: SCDSC/SCHRIO uploads data to 
eIDSR/DHIS2 weekly and monthly. Hard copy reports are 
filed for all reporting entities 
Health Facility level:  Surveillance Focal Person/Facility 
In-charges sends reports weekly by SMS (eIDSR) or 
monthly by hard copy reports (DHIS2) 
Community Level: CHEWs and CHVs collect 
surveillance information 
DSRU & HMIS: Can View 
weekly/Monthly report in 
eIDSR and DHIS2 
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Information on surveillance is shared with stakeholders in all the three counties. Sharing is 
through written reports, dissemination meetings (Monthly/Quarterly reviews) and the weekly 
epidemiological bulletin published by the DSRU. 
5.1.4.7 Resources needed for Surveillance at the county level 
There is currently no structured funding mechanism for surveillance at the three counties. Where 
available, erratic funding mainly from county governments and WHO were reported by the 
counties. Other health partners mainly funded programs where they have interest for example; 
Aphia Plus funded cholera prevention sensitization in Kakamega County. 
In terms of human resources, all the three counties had one surveillance officer each, deployed at 
the county level (CDSC). The same was replicated across board for all the sub counties. 
However, there were cases where some sub Counties had no surveillance coordinators and were 
covered by officers from neighboring sub counties. Public health Officers previously deployed to 
Locations level have been redefined to cover Wards under the devolved health care system in 
Busia and Bungoma counties but this was not the case in Kakamega County. 
There were variations as to the type of physical infrastructure available in the counties for 
surveillance. Only Kakamega County had an office allocated for surveillance activities while 
only Bungoma County had a computer dedicated for surveillance work. All counties were found 
to have mobile phones supplied to sub county surveillance officers to support surveillance work. 
In all the three counties, shared transport means, electricity and stationery were available for 
surveillance activities. Bungoma and Busia Counties reported no access to internet for 
surveillance officers. 
5.1.4.8 Availability of Physical Infrastructure for Surveillance in Counties 
Physical 
Infrastructure 
Kakamega County  Busia County Bungoma County 
Office Space Yes  No No 
Computers No  No Yes 
Mobile Phones Yes  Yes Yes 
Transport Shared  Shared Shared 
Stationery Shared  Shared Shared 
Electricity Shared  Shared Shared 
Internet Yes  No No 
There was a wide disparity in terms of funds availed for surveillance in the previous financial 
year. Kakamega County had Ksh 5 million allocated for surveillance in the previous financial 
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year. Bungoma County had a budget of approximately 1.3 million Kenya shillings. Busia County 
had a total budget is Ksh. 300,000 for surveillance activities.  
5.1.4.9 Annual Budgets for Surveillance Activities, 2013-2014 financial 
Vote Kakamega County  Busia County Bungoma County 
Training   Not Funded Not Funded 
Mail/Courier Not Funded  Not Funded 54,000 
Transport    1,200,000 
Internet   Not Funded 36,000 
Electricity Shared budget  Not Funded Shared Budget 
Airtime   Not Funded Shared Budget 
Stationery   Not Funded Not Funded 
System Maintenance Not Funded  Not Funded Not Funded 
Other   Lunches NA 
Overall Total 5,000,000  300,000 1,290,000 
 
5.1.4.10 Digital/Computerized Surveillance tools 
All the three counties had access to both the electronic and manual IDSR technical guidelines. 
All the counties could access the eIDSR database >50% of the times and poor internet 
connectivity was cited as the main reason for unavailability of eISDR. 
5.1.4.11 Surveillance system Attributes 
Data Quality: The system quality checks put in place by the counties to ensure data is of high 
quality were varied. In Kakamega and Busia Counties, data quality audits and support 
supervision were cited to be key in ensuring data quality. Additionally, Kakamega County cited 
monthly data review meetings where county and sub county data would be interrogated and 
revised accordingly. In Bungoma County, data sharing, use of ‘revise’ options by data officers 
and comparison with national data from the weekly epidemiological bulletin were cited as some 
of the ways to ensure data quality. 
System Integration and Interoperability: All the respondents felt that the current systems for 
surveillance are not integrated and are not interoperable. However, all the respondents welcomed 
the idea to integrate. 
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Data Security: Manual data backup and restricted access to data through password protected 
data bases, user credentials and physical restrictions like locked offices were cited by all counties 
as the main means of ensuring surveillance data remains secure. In Kakamega County, 
surveillance data is also afforded by surveillance officers through use of electronic back up of 
surveillance data in computer hard drives. 
Confidentiality: Kakamega county reported use of restricted access to data through password 
login and lack of patient identifiers on the captured data as the main ways of ensuring 
surveillance data is confidential. 
Completeness and Timeliness: In all the three counties, there has been a steady rise in both 
completeness and timeliness of reporting, based on complete data sets for MOH 705 A and B. 
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Usefulness and Acceptability: All participants interviewed agreed that the current systems for 
surveillance in counties are both useful as they can detect diseases or events under surveillance 
in a timely way to permit accurate diagnosis, prevention and treatment. These systems are also 
able to; provide estimates of the magnitude of morbidity or mortality related to the health event 
detect trends that may signal changes in occurrence of disease allow assessment of prevention 
and control measures, lead to improved clinical, behavioral and social environment and also 
stimulate public health research. These two systems of surveillance are also highly acceptable as 
they have been adopted by all levels of health care and completeness and timeliness of reporting 
are both high. However, in Kakamega County, the respondents felt that the systems are not 
useful for all disease conditions. They felt the systems are weak for zoonotic diseases due to low 
reporting and lack of sensitization of health workers on reporting of zoonotic diseases. 
Simplicity: All the respondents felt that the systems of surveillance are adequately simple. 
Flexibility/Adaptability/Scalability: The systems of surveillance in use are flexible and easily 
adaptable. The respondents felt that with advent of devolution, the systems were able to adapt to 
the changing information needs (e.g. reporting structure, increase in levels of reporting, change 
of sub county/county boundaries etc.) with little addition of time, personnel, or allocated funds. 
Newer disease conditions can also be added to the system with little changes to the structure. The 
reporting formats are also standard and can be easily adapted to integrate other sets of 
information. However, 1/3 of the respondents felt that the systems have not fully adapted to 
devolution. This is because they felt there is still disconnect between the expectation of the 
county executive team and the ability of the technical team in surveillance. They also felt that the 
flow of funds meant for surveillance has been hampered by devolution which has affected 
activities like sample transport, training and lack of technical capacity to handle surveillance. 
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5.2 Animal Health Disease Surveillance Systems 
5.2.1 National Level 
At the national level, three assessment sites were evaluated using Key Informant Interviews and 
observation. The sites included the Veterinary Epidemiology and Economics Unit (VEEU), 
Veterinary Public Health and Animal Products (VPH&AP), Zoonotic Disease Unit (ZDU) and 
the Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS) 
5.2.1.1 VETERINARY EPIDEMIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS UNIT 
5.2.1.1.1 Surveillance system details 
The main focus at the VEEU was livestock surveillance activities targeting animal diseases. The 
unit performed passive and active surveillance. The passive system involved receipt of reports 
from animal health practitioners, livestock owners, abattoirs and livestock markets. However, the 
passive surveillance is faced with challenges of underreporting and to get additional data the 
units undertakes active surveillance by conducting outbreak investigation, use of diagnostic 
techniques and data from the laboratories. 
Among the zoonotic diseases the unit cover included Rift Valley Fever (RVF), Leptospirosis, 
Trypanosomiasis, Hydatidosis, Anthrax, Brucellosis, Taeniosis, Cryptococcosis, Rabies, 
Cysticercosis and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome-Corona Virus (MERS-Cov) 
The main objectives of the system were identified as;  
1. Know diseases present and their distribution in the country 
2. Early detection and action 
3. To inform Policy 
4. To protect human beings from zoonosis 
The legal authority to engage in disease surveillance was derived from the Animal Diseases Act 
(cap 364 of the Laws of Kenya), World Organization for Animal health (OIE) manuals and 
codes,  
The administrative structure of the surveillance system was described as starting from the 
community where community disease reporters (formerly called Community Based Animal 
Health Workers, CBAHW’s in some areas) and livestock owners giving information to the 
frontline staff made of Animal Health Assistants (AHA’s). The AHA’s then forward the 
information to the Sub County Veterinary Officer (SCVO) based at the sub county level. The 
SCVO collates the data and send the reports to the Count Director of Veterinary Services 
(CDVS) at the county level. The CDVS aggregates the data which is then forwarded to the head 
of VEEU. The head of VEEU reports to the head of Disaster Management and Surveillance 
(DM&S) who then reports to the head of Disease Surveillance, Vectors and Zoological Control 
Services (DSV&ZCS). The head of DSV&ZCS reports to the Director of Veterinary Services 
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(DVS) who is the Country Chief Veterinarian. The DVS reports to the OIE on a regular basis and 
notifies OIE of occurrence of diseases or event that affects international trade.  
Disease surveillance activities are supported by veterinary laboratories in the country. There is a 
central veterinary laboratory (CVL) that is located at the veterinary division headquarters in 
Kabete, Kenya. The activities of the CVL are augmented by regional veterinary investigation 
laboratories (RVIL) located at different parts of the country. The veterinary laboratory services 
are operated by the national government and receive samples from both public and government 
veterinary service providers. Results from the RVIL are shared with the individuals who 
requested the tests and the CVL. In some instances farmers (especially poultry farmers) take 
samples to the laboratories without going through the veterinary service providers. 
Figure 1: Organogram for disease reporting, VEEU, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The population under surveillance was the whole national herd. Passive system collected data all 
the time while active system collected data periodically. Some of the diseases were under active 
surveillance like RVF which had sentinel herds in high risk areas of Machakos, Naivasha, Uasin 
Gishu and Taveta with activities being funded by the DVS. Sentinel Surveillance in Garissa and 
Ijara stopped due to withdrawal of support by donors (FAO). Data collected from the sentinel 
herds included sampling to detect Immunoglobulin M (IgM) and IgG, Prevalence, Zero reporting 
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from farms, and markets where observation is made and officers have to ascertain that the 
disease is absent 
Data Source for the system included farmers, Animal Health Service Providers (AHSP’s), Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) especially in the Arid and Semi-Arid Land (ASAL’s) 
The methods of data transfer included use of forms like the Notifiable Disease 1(ND1), 
Electronic mails (E-mails), Mobile phones and Telephone. The Digital Pen Technology (DPT) 
was being used in 24.1% (70/290) of the sub counties in the country.  
Data sent to the VEEU by E-mail was being stored in database in desktop computer while that 
from DPT was stored in a computer server at the national veterinary services headquarters in 
Kabete, Kenya. Data collected by use of Epi-collect was stored in the cloud server 
Analysis of the data was being done by staff members in the unit. The data was screened 
monthly and quarterly data analysis done using Ms excel®  
Dissemination of the analyzed data was being done every 3 months (Quarterly) to the county 
heads (CDVS) using quarterly bulletins. Quarterly bulletins were shared via e-mails. It was 
expected that the county heads would disseminate to the sub counties and other lower levels of 
the system.  
The activities of the unit were being funded from the allocations from the DVS kitty. The 
number of staff members at the unit was 8. The ideal number of staff who specifically charged 
with surveillance activities was estimated to be 15 at the national level and 47 at the county level. 
It was noted that specialized staff are needed to handle various aspects data. The unit was 
focusing more on epidemiology and less on economic aspect of its mandate. It was noted that 
staff to handle economic aspects of disease surveillance were lacking. 
The status of infrastructure/equipment at the unit was as tabulated below; 
Status  Equipment  Remarks 
Adequate Office space, computer server, GPS gadgets, 
Digital Pens 
Digital pens at national level 
only 
Inadequate Vehicle (2 grounded), stationery   
Absent PDA, phones, internet Use of personal internet  
modems 
 
The estimated cost of surveillance activities was as below 
Item  Estimated cost per year, Kes Remarks 
Training  3,000,000.00  Use for workshops on technical issues 
Transport 300,000,00  
Airtime 60,000 Per person. Given to some cadres 
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Stationery  50,000.00  
System maintenance 1,000,000.00 Backstopping,  
TOTAL 4,410,000.00  
 
There were document that described the contingency plans and disease control strategies for 
some diseases like RVF contingency plan, Rabies eradication strategy. The documents were 
available both in electronic and paper forms. 
The digital or computerized surveillance tools that were in use at the unit included; 
1. Epi-Collect – mobile phone technology: No special infrastructure needed, use of personal 
mobile phones (android enabled). Involves development of Module (questionnaire) that is 
uploaded in the android phone. Information transmitted real-time and data stored in the 
cloud. Being used in some parts of the country where it was piloted during training. Not 
properly rolled out. No infrastructure available  
2. Digital Pen Technology: Has a digitized form, digitized pen and digitized phone. Uses a 
server based in South Africa. Web-based and real time data transmission. About 70 sub 
counties expected to be using but less than 10 sub counties are using it. Developed by 
support from FAO.  The technology is a Forms processing and mobile phone technology 
that uses a battery-operated writing instrument that allows the user to digitally capture a 
handwritten note or drawing. The digital pens are wireless and use Bluetooth technology 
to send the captured notes or drawings directly to a server through a cell phone. The 
technology aids in real-time data collection, transmission and processing. 
3. ARIS II: Animal Resources and Information System II is a comprehensive open source 
software application with unique features. Data transmission is through a web based 
system using a web-based questionnaire. It has an offline mode that can be used in areas 
with poor internet connectivity. The system is capable of providing real time information 
gathering and sharing. It also has the advantage of customization to country specification 
and needs. The system allows data validation and sharing. The system uses a modular 
approach which covers aspects of animal health, animal production, capacity 
(infrastructure and human) and trade and marketing. The Server hosted at AU_IBAR. 
Once uploaded, data can be viewed by authorized Government officers and AU_IBAR. It 
is not effectively used by the animal health service providers due to inadequate resources 
for its operation. 
4. Notifiable disease reporting through Ms Excel® Spreadsheet templates that are filled at 
the sub county level and then forwarded to the VEEU in Kabete 
Computerized systems operated at less than 50% 
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5.2.1.1.2 Surveillance system attributes  
The quality checks put in place to ensure system performed optimally included validation of 
reports before uploading or forwarding to higher levels, making calls to confirm information 
provided and backstopping,   
Integration with other systems: the system was not integrated to other surveillance systems. 
There was need to integrate the various aspects of the system so that single output is generated 
from the various systems. 
Data security: to ensure data security, the system used pass words, allowed limited access to 
those authorized and employed the use of lockable cabinets to store files. 
Confidentiality: for anyone outside the unit to access data in the system the authority from the 
DVS must be sought. 
The system was not able to detect diseases or adverse exposures of public health importance in a 
timely manner, especially after the devolution of animal health services to the county 
governments.  
The system was not able to estimate the magnitude of morbidity and mortality related to the 
health-related event under surveillance. This was due to the fact that the reports received from 
the field was not representative of the national herd 
The system was able to detect trends that signal changes in the occurrence of diseases including 
detection of epidemics or outbreaks  
The system was able to permit assessment of the effect of prevention and control programs 
The system could lead to improved clinical, behavioral, policy or environment practices 
The system was able to stimulate research intended to lead to prevention and control 
The aspect of the system that was identified to be unnecessarily complicated was the presence of 
many data collection tools that were not harmonized leading to slow uptake and sustenance. The 
changes that could make the system easier to implement would be harmonization of the tools, 
development of a strategic plan for electronic reporting and development of Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP’s) for each system 
The system was slow in adapting to changes like the devolution of veterinary services to the 
counties. The slow adaptation was attributed to the lack of acceptable effective system, the 
impediment from the county government administration and use of devolution as an excuse not 
to report to the national level.  
The elements that were identified to be making the system not adapt included absence of proper 
networking of the systems and lack of effective network with regional laboratories 
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5.2.1.2 VETERINARY PUBLIC HEALTH & ANIMAL PRODUCTS DIVISION 
Assessment site Veterinary public health and animal products division based at the national 
level. 
5.2.1.2.1 Surveillance system details 
The major surveillance focus was on foodborne diseases at the slaughter houses. There are 
different categories of slaughter houses based on the operations and infrastructure; export and 
local slaughter houses. There are meat inspectors in each slaughter facility. Animals come into 
the slaughter facilities by use of movement permits that indicate where the animal has come from 
and the history of movement of the animals. The origin of the animals must be without any on-
going disease outbreak. The animals are held in slaughterhouse lairages for ante-mortem 
inspection. After slaughter, postmortem is done. During postmortem disease conditions can be 
determined by observation but incase diagnosis is not possible by observation, and then samples 
are taken to the laboratory for further analysis. Monthly reports are written by the meat 
inspectors detailing the lesions and diseases detected. Reports from the slaughter house are 
forwarded to the Sub County and County level. Collated county reports are then forwarded to the 
Director of veterinary services, through the head of veterinary public health 
Among the zoonotic diseases that the division focuses on include echinococcosis, anthrax (noted 
in the lairages), brucellosis, Rabies (at ante mortem), Bovine TB, Cysticercosis, Schistosomiasis, 
Dermatophylosis,  
It was noted that some animals presented for slaughter had marks and discolorations at injection 
sites pointing to a possibility of animals being brought to the slaughter facilities before observing 
the withdrawal periods of the administered drugs. This could lead to consumption of animal 
products with drug residues. 
The main objective of the system was determined to be public health and animal health.  
The legal authority to perform surveillance was derived from the Animal Disease Act, Meat 
Control act, Public Health act, Rabies act, OIE codes, codex alimentarius commission standards, 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreements and Veterinary 
Surgeons and Veterinary Para-professionals act (VSVP). The VSVP act ensures that every 
veterinarian and Para veterinarian reports veterinary incidence to the DVS they come across. 
Administratively the system has Animal Health Assistants (AHA’s) who are the meat inspectors 
at the slaughter facilities. The Meat Inspectors report to the veterinary officer in charge of 
hygiene at the slaughter house level or to the SCVO. The SCVO reports to the CDVS office 
where data is collated before transmission to the head of VPH&AP’s. The staff at the export 
slaughter houses report directly to the head of Veterinary Public Health in the VPH&AP 
division. 
The type of data collected include sex of the animal, pregnancy state, disease and conditions 
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Data transfer from the slaughter house to CDVS is by paper and from the CDVS to the head of 
VPH&AP through paper or electronically. Data storage is by filing for paper based data and soft 
copies in desk top computer or compact discs. No data analysis is done but the division does 
interpretation of the data received. The reports are shared with the stakeholders on quarterly and 
annual basis through written reports and in meetings or training sessions for the meat inspectors. 
Resources for use at the local slaughter houses at the county level are provided by the county 
government while resources for the export slaughterhouses are provided by the DVS through the 
Veterinary Services Development Fund (VSDF).  
The personnel present at the division was as tabulated below; 
Officers  Number in post Optimum number 
Meat Inspectors 33 43 
Veterinary Officers 5 10 
Officers at head office 6 6 
 
Most of the resources were shared with no specific ones allocated to surveillance activities. Due 
to that, the actual cost of performing surveillance activities could not be determined. 
5.2.1.2.2 Surveillance system attributes 
The system is not integrated with other system but share information with other divisions like the 
laboratories and the VEEU. Data stored in the system is secured with passwords and lockable 
cabinets. The delay in transmission of data from the slaughter facilities to the national level was 
identified as a complication to the system. Inadequate resources like ICT equipment and 
personnel contributed to the system not being able to adapt to changes 
5.2.1.3 ZOONOTIC DISEASE UNIT (ZDU) 
The ZDU was formed in 2011 through an MOU between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. Its mission is to establish and maintain active 
collaboration at the animal, human, and ecosystem interface towards better prevention and 
control of zoonotic diseases. It envisions a country with reduced burden of zoonotic diseases and 
better able to respond to epidemics of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. 
5.2.1.3.1 Description of the Surveillance System 
ZDU has a surveillance system which focuses on human and livestock surveillance activities. It 
was described as a “Pilot Zoonotic Surveillance System”. It started in July 2014, piloted in ten 
(10) selected Counties. The surveillance focuses on 5 zoonotic diseases namely Rift Valley 
Fever, Human African Trypanosomiasis, Brucellosis, Anthrax, Rabies/Dog bites 
The main objective of the surveillance system is; 
• To capture data on priority zoonosis which is missing in main surveillance systems 
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• Map high risk areas 
• Inform targeted surveillance 
• Guide interventions 
There is no legal authority/Legislation governing this surveillance system but is guided by the 
MOU between both ministries. Inferences are made to existing regulations e.g. Animal Disease 
Act, The Public Health Act. ZDU  
The administrative organization and location of the surveillance system is as described below; 
   
     
 
                                                                         Sent weekly data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1.3.2 Components of the Surveillance System 
The population under surveillance is the 10 selected counties  of 
Kakamega,Siaya,Kajiado,Kiambu,Nakuru,Laikipia,Machakos,Garissa,Kajiado,Kisumu and 
Baringo.The data is collected weekly and the information collected is counts of human cases 
alive or dead and counts of animals as well as the  species. The sources of data for human 
include; Laboratory and health facility OPD. For livestock data sources are; farmers, abattoirs 
and laboratory. Data is transferred and stored electronically. Data collected is analyzed by the 
ZDU staff (this has been done only once) and they use Microsoft excel for simple analysis of the 
counts. The results are disseminated to stakeholders through meetings e.g. World Bank. 
There is a computerized surveillance tool, managed by the ministry staff which is operational 
75% of the time in a month. There are no quality checks in this system and it does not integrate 
County-OH Focal person (collect data 
from different sub counties) 
Sub-County-OH Focal person (collect 
data from DVO and Facilities) 
 
ZDU 
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with other existing surveillance systems. Data is secured using a password, data is de identified 
and shared among staff only. 
5.2.1.3.3 Resources needed to operate the surveillance system 
The ZDU main source of funding is the General Operations Kit from the two main ministries. 
Other funding sources include partners and donors. 
Personnel 
Level No. Present(technical) Optimum 
National 0 1 
County 1 1 
Sub-County 1 1 
Health Facility 0 1 
 
Infrastructure 
The infrastructure available is shared and includes; office space, computers, phones, computer 
server, Transport, stationary, electricity, internet and airtime. This is not available at the County 
level. 
Other Direct costs 
Category Cost USD Frequency 
Trainings 48,000 Annual 
Mail/Courier 0 Use existing system 
Transport 2,000 Twice a year 
Internet 600 Annual 
Electricity 150 Monthly 
Airtime 500 Monthly 
Stationary 120 Monthly 
System maintenance   
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5.2.1.3.4 Surveillance System Attributes  
Attribute Response(yes/no/
don’t know) 
Remarks 
Timeliness(Detect public health 
events and diseases in a timely 
way) 
No This is what the system aims to achieve 
in the future 
Estimate magnitude of health 
related events 
No Aiming at that. 
Detect changes in trends, 
patterns e.g. in outbreaks 
Yes For the regularly reported diseases. 
Help in assessment of prevention 
and control measures 
No It could but currently it cannot  
Lead to improved clinical, 
social, policy and environmental 
practices (usefulness) 
No Eventually, it will do so. 
Stimulate Research Yes e.g. When the cases reported show an 
increase(outbreaks) 
 
Simplicity 
Yes With training anyone can use the system 
 
Adaptation to devolution 
The System has shown that it can be able to adapt to the effects of devolution of animal and 
human health services to the counties since it is being developed and rolled out post devolution. 
The only challenge cited is that, it cannot go to the community level since it is computerized and 
requires internet to operate and the Information Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure 
is either absent or not well developed. 
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5.2.1.4 KENYA WILDLIFE SERVICES 
5.2.1.4.1 Surveillance System Details 
The major surveillance activity focused on wild animal disease surveillance 
The system known as Wildlife Surveillance was made of mostly passive disease surveillance 
with more focus on mortality and morbidity episodes 
Active surveillance was project or research based, collaborative or internally organized by the 
KWS on need basis. 
It was noted that there was no structured organizational system for surveillance. 
The zoonotic diseases covered by the system included;  
Anthrax - had caused most deaths of wild animals, had trade and Public Health importance. 
Rabies – affected carnivores (feline and canidae families), is of Public Health importance, it was 
noted that efforts were being put in prevention in dog population around wildlife areas in order to 
prevent spread to wild animals 
Rift Valley Fever – its role in wildlife not well documented, deaths were recorded during the 
2007/2008 outbreak 
Bovine Tuberculosis – It was noted that the disease is of importance because of its history of 
endemicity in some areas where it affects buffaloes. The fear of spread to carnivores (especially 
lions that are currently endangered) that feed on buffaloes made surveillance of the disease a 
priority 
Human African Trypanosomiasis – There were reports of isolated cases 
Sarcopsis – It was reported that it affected especially large cats (cheetahs), endemic in some 
parks (Mara) 
Yellow Fever – Was considered to be of public health importance and thought to be originating 
from the non-human primates. 
Influenza (Avian) – The department fills zero reports in cases of bird deaths to rule out possible 
cases in the wild birds. 
Q-fever was put under surveillance on need basis: Q-fever 
The main objectives of the surveillance activities at KWS were identified; 
1. Early warning (both ways) - monitor spillovers of diseases from domesticated animals to 
wild animals and from wild animals to domestic animals. 
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2. To understand current status diseases affecting wild animals. 
3. To monitor health status of wildlife 
5.2.1.4.2 Legal Authority for surveillance activities  
There was no specific legal statute for surveillance of disease of wild animals. However, the 
KWS anchored its surveillance activities on the provision of the animal diseases act (cap 364 of 
the laws of Kenya) and OIE guidelines on disease reporting. It was noted that surveillance 
exercises were anchored on disease management activities.  
5.2.1.4.3 Organogram 
The administrative organization was divided into departments as clinical intervention, capture 
and translocation, outbreak investigation, disease surveillance and monitoring, veterinary 
research, laboratory services. All the departments contributed to the surveillance activities. The 
service had 6 mobile veterinary units  
Figure 3: Organizational structure for disease reporting, KWS, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data from the mobile veterinary units, translocation arm, research and lab are forwarded to head 
of KWS veterinary services who collates the data and forward to the KWS Chief Veterinary 
Officer. The Chief veterinary Officer send reports to the Director of Veterinary Services on a 
regular basis. The DVS then send reports to the OIE. In some instances where the disease or 
event affects international trade (trade-sensitive diseases), KWS chief vet officer can report 
directly to OIE. 
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There were 6 veterinary officers manning 8 regions. The regions were; Tsavo, southern, 
mountain, eastern, central rift, western, northern, coast. Few wildlife challenges were experience 
in Western Kenya, and as such no veterinarian is attached to the region. The Western region was 
being supported by the veterinarian in Mara (southern) or Nanyuki (Mountain). In areas without 
veterinarians a team is assembled from the KWS headquarter to handle issues in those areas. 
Standby team is always present ready for deployment in case the need arises.  
Information flow in areas without veterinarian is through the area warden who gets information 
from the community and forwards it to the KWS headquarters. The community members notices 
unusual occurrence, notifies the warden or the head office. Information is verified by the warden 
or the head office. The head office takes appropriate action. The community can also report to a 
veterinarian near the area. 
5.2.1.4.4 Components of the Surveillance system 
The population under surveillance was the wild animals in the country. Data collection is done 
continuously, collated on a quarterly basis then forwarded to the DVS twice per year. The type of 
data generated included mortality, morbidity, species affected, location of the animals, clinical 
cases attended to, biometric information of the animals. The sources of data were field activities, 
laboratory (Central Veterinary Laboratory, Government chemist, S. Africa) results. The data 
from the field is entered into computer and transferred electronically to a computer data base 
located at the KWS headquarters where it is stored.  
5.2.1.4.5 Data analysis and dissemination  
It was reported that data analysis is done by a senior veterinary officer every quarter using 
Microsoft Excel®. Advanced analysis is done in project based activities. The analyzed data was 
disseminated quarterly, half yearly and annually to stakeholders who included the KWS 
Management (Field and Office headquarters), donors, collaborators (research institutions), 
private and community conservancy management and the general public through the corporate 
communication department. 
5.2.1.4.6 Resources needed to operate the system 
The funds for surveillance activities got from the KWS, Donors, and collaborators. It was noted 
that there was no personnel dedicated to surveillance activities and there were no County-based 
personnel.  
Most resources are shared. None specific to surveillance, Budget fluctuates 
5.2.1.4.7 Documents for surveillance activities  
There was a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for surveillance activities. The document 
detailed the flow of information for the community to the headquarters. 
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5.2.1.4.8 Computerized Disease Surveillance Tools 
It was noted that there was no computerized tools for surveillance and no electronic template for 
data collection. 
5.2.1.4.9 Integration 
The system was not integrated to any other systems but there was a lot of willingness to integrate 
with other systems to enable information sharing among various stakeholders. 
5.2.1.4.10 Surveillance system attributes  
The system was able to provide estimates of the magnitude of health-related events, detect 
trends, permit assessment of effect of prevention and control programs, lead to improved practice 
and stimulate research. 
It was noted that the passive nature of disease surveillance led to complications in the system. 
Lack of integration of wildlife surveillance into domestic and human diseases surveillance 
system had made the system not to adapt to changes. 
5.2.2 County level 
At the county level, data collection was done by use of Key Informant Interviews (KII’s), 
Focused Group Discussions (FGD’s) and Observations. The counties that were evaluated include 
Busia, Kakamega and Bungoma. 
5.2.2.1 BUNGOMA 
a. Key Informant Interviews 
The interviews were conducted with the county director of Veterinary Services at the county 
veterinary office. 
Assessment Site: County Veterinary Services, County of Bungoma 
5.2.2.1.1 Surveillance System Details 
The system focused on surveillance of diseases of domesticated animals in Bungoma County 
The county undertakes passive diseases surveillance in slaughter houses, auction rings, market 
(on market days) and  active disease surveillance targeting Trypanosomiasis and its vectors the  
Tse Tse Flies. The tools used for data collection and transmission included the Notifiable 
Disease form (ND1) for notifiable diseases, LB1 form for laboratory diagnosis, PP1 for slaughter 
house, Zero report for Avian Influenza, rinderpest and other notifiable diseases. The county had 
the gadgets for Digital Pen Technology (DPT) but they were not being used. 
The zoonotic diseases that were under surveillances in the county included Rift Valley Fever 
(RVF), Trypanosomiasis (T brucei, T. gambianse, T. congolenses), Brucellosis, Anthrax, Rabies 
(follow up on dog bites referred from hospitals), Cysticercosis (at Post Mortem at slaughter 
 43 
 
points), Salmonellosis (clinical diagnosis, routine screening for S. gallinarium, S pullorum), 
Avian Influenza 
The objectives of the surveillance system included; 
1. Disease prevention   
2. Creating awareness  
3. Improve diagnosis 
There were no legislations specific to surveillance activities in the county. The veterinary 
services relied on the national legislations. Among the legislation used in surveillance activities 
included the Animal Diseases Act (cap 364 of the Laws of Kenya), the Meat Control Act (cap 
356 of the Laws of Kenya), and the Rabies Act (cap 365 of the Laws of Kenya).  
The structure of the system involved the community where the farmers and the administration 
forwarded information to the private Animal Health Service Providers (AHSP’s) and the Animal 
Health Assistants (AHA) employed by the government as frontline staff in diseases surveillance 
and management. The AHA’s and AHSP’s then forward the information to the Sub County 
Veterinary Officers (SCVO) based at the Sub Counties, the second level of the county 
administration. The SCVO forwards information to the County Director of Veterinary Services 
(CDVS) and the Director of Veterinary Services (DVS). There was no unit within the system 
dealing with disease surveillance. 
The population under surveillance included livestock (bovine, avian, caprine) in the county, dogs 
and cats. The interaction of dogs with wolves during breeding season posed a challenge of 
possibility of transmission of diseases from the wild animals to the domestic animals. Cases of 
bites from bats and rats had been reported calling.  A lot of attention was being given to livestock 
and little on non-livestock animals like cats, dogs 
Data was being collected on a daily basis continuously with increased data collection during 
unexpected events like flooding. The data collected included results of observation from 
mouthing from a representative sample of the herd, zero reports, counts, numbers affected, 
numbers exposed, location, origin of the animals. Information was being generated by the 
frontline staff (AHA’s) at auction rings, farmers in the market, private AHSP’s by use of 
monthly reports, emergencies reported through phone, in person, orally or text message. 
The data was being transferred verbally by phone calls and meeting face to face at community 
level, use of note books by staff at markets and auction rings, documentation at Sub County by 
use of registers and reports.  It was reported that not much information was being received from 
the private AHSP’s, and that coupled with the tendency of meat inspectors preferring not to 
provide animal health services led to inadequate information on disease surveillance. 
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Information was being stored in paper form in files and cabinets, and the electronic form in desk 
top computer.  
Analysis of the data was being done on monthly basis by the SCVO and the CDVS. The analysis 
focused on counts, economic loss from condemnations in meat inspection, condemnation figures, 
and disease conditions seen in the slaughter houses 
The analyzed data was being disseminated by the SCVO using monthly and annual reports to the 
CDVS and the DVS. Dissemination to the community took place during public meetings. 
Most of the resources used for surveillance activities were got from the county government. It 
was reported that most non-governmental sponsorships supported livestock production activities 
with little on disease management activities. There were no resources set aside specifically for 
surveillance activities as the resources were shared with other animal health activities. 
There was no document describing the surveillance system.  
5.2.2.1.2 Digital/Computerized Surveillance System  
There was no functional computerized system for data collection and dissemination.   
5.2.2.1.3 Surveillance System Attributes 
The quality checks put in place included physical verification, visits and training of disease 
committees. The system was neither integrated nor connected to other surveillance systems; 
however the county veterinary officers were willing to allow their system to be integrated to 
other disease surveillance systems.  
To ensure data security, the system had files locked in cabinets and only relevant officers had 
access to the data. 
The system was able to detect diseases but not in a timely manner. The system was able to 
provide estimates of the magnitude of morbidity and mortality, detect trends that signal the 
changes in the occurrence of diseases, permit assessment of the effect of prevention and control 
programs. It could lead to improved practices like the reports on many cases of Human African 
Trypanosomiasis (HAT) that led to increased control measures like use of nets, tse tse targets, 
and movement restrictions. The system was also able to stimulate research like the season or 
trends in dog bites had led to studies on the dog ecology and population control. 
The complications that were identified in the system included bureaucracy at the community 
level that led to farmers getting disillusioned in case their issues are not addressed to their 
satisfaction. The lack of effective diagnostic tools had led to apathy in reporting of cases from 
the community especially in cases of deliberate poisoning of foraging animals. It was reported 
that there was a feeling among the community members that nothing will be done even if they 
reported cases to the authorities leading to disappointments and missing of cases or vital reports. 
 45 
 
Among the changes that were proposed to improve on surveillance included the reduction of red 
tape, empowerment of regional laboratories and equipping of the local laboratories to detect 
cases.  
It was noted that the system was not able to adapt to changes like devolution of veterinary 
services to the county due to slow pace of surveillance activities, non-functional equipment, and 
use of non-standardized documents contrary to the requirements by the national and international 
organizations, and emergencies not being addressed in a timely manner. 
5.2.2.2 KAKAMEGA 
Assessment site: Veterinary Services, County of Kakamega 
5.2.2.2.1 Surveillance System Details 
The major surveillance activity was on diseases of livestock and other domestic animals. The 
county was using the Animal Resources Information System (ARIS) and Digital Pen Technology 
though not effectively. Other surveillance activities included meat inspection services where 
finding were being reported on a monthly basis.  
The zoonotic diseases that the county focused on included Anthrax, RVF, Leptospirosis, 
Listeriosis, Hydatidosis, Brucellosis, Anthrax, Taeniosis, rabies, Cysticercosis (Capacity for 
detection of Cysticercosis was very low and relied on visual or ante-mortem or post-mortem 
inspection. 
The main objectives of the system were identified included; 
1. Control diseases situation in good time to reduce loses,  
2. Protect animals, humans and environment 
The legal authority to perform surveillance activities was derived for the national legislation like 
the Anima Diseases Act (cap 364), The Meat Control Act (cap 356), the Rabies Act (cap 365), 
and the Public Health Act (cap 242), the International Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
regulations contained in the aquatic and Terrestrial codes. It was noted that there were no county-
specific laws on surveillance. 
Structurally, the system involved the Sub County Veterinary Officer (SCVO) who receives 
information from the meat inspectors, Animal Health Assistants (AHA’s), field workers in 
livestock markets, farm visits, home visits, stock routes, slaughter points). The data is collated by 
the SCVO who then forwards the reports to the County Director of Veterinary Services (CDVS). 
The CDVS then key in information from the various SCVO’s into a report that is sent to Director 
of Veterinary Services through the Technical Team at the National level. It was noted that there 
was no structure of reporting to the county government, but information was being shared with 
the relevant county government officials whenever there were threats to human life from 
diseases in order to request for funds to handle the situation.   
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The population under surveillance in the county included cattle (approximately 320000), sheep 
and goats (approximately 250,000), poultry (approximately 1,000,000), dogs (approximately 
50,000) and pigs (approximately 10,000). Data was being collected on a daily basis and reports 
compiled on a monthly basis. Information from the filed officers was aggregated and no data 
analysis done. The sources of data included animal owners and trained personnel working at 
slaughter points and markets.  Data transfer was through paper. The paper-based data is entered 
into a computer at the county level and stored in the desk top computer. The information from 
the CDVS is shared with the DVS who then disseminate the information to the lower levels in 
the system. However, it was reported that the system was not working well. 
There was no allocation of funds for surveillance activities by the county government 
surveillance and no personnel dedicated to do disease surveillance activities. It was reported that 
there was a shortage of staff leading to Meat Inspectors doubling as frontline officers in the 
livestock market. The county had 32 AHA’s, 10 Veterinary officers serving 13 sub counties and 
40 private Animal Health Service Providers (AHSP’s). The CDVS had a desktop computer and 2 
phones for use in the delivery of veterinary services. Most resources were being shared with 
other veterinary service activities. The county had no means of transport dedicated to disease 
surveillance activities. 
No document explaining the disease surveillance system was available.  
5.2.2.2.2 Surveillance System Attributes 
There was no computerized system of data handling in the county. However, the officers had 
some equipment for use in the ARIS. The ARIS was not being used in the county due to lack of 
effective infrastructure at the county and national level. 
The system was not integrated with other systems, but there was willingness to integrate with the 
systems in wildlife health, human health, animal health and environment health. 
To ensure the ARIS performed optimally, the information fed into the system from the field had 
to be reviewed, sieved and corrected at sub county level then sent to the county level within the 
system. The county level forwarded the data to the national level within the system. The Lower 
level could not access or review what the higher level reviewed. The higher level then gave 
feedback to other lower levels in form of a report or bulletin. The system allowed traceability 
through geographic location information provided within the system. 
Accessibility to the platform was restricted to the known users who could access the system 
using passwords to guarantee data security. 
The ARIS could detect diseases and exposures of public health importance but not in a timely 
manner. The system could not detect trends that signal changes in the occurrence of disease. 
However, the system could provide estimates of morbidity and mortality related to the health-
related event under surveillance by using counts and analysis at the national level. The system 
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could not permit assessment of the effect of prevention and control programs since it was in use 
for a short period and had inadequate infrastructure. The system was able to stimulate research 
and influence practices 
The complication that were identified in the system included the fact that the Digital Pen 
Technology (DPT) needed digitized pen, digitized phone and digitized form; the three had to in 
good working condition for the system to operate. In addition, most users needed to understand 
how to use the equipment but had configuration challenges. To avoid the complications, it was 
noted that the system needed to be programmed to use one integrated tool and not different 
components.  
The system had not been able to adapt to changes due to inadequate infrastructure. The 
components required maintenance (charging), needed the digitized paper, digitized pen. All the 
components needed to be working properly for the system to be effective. 
Other factors that were identified to impede operation of the system included inadequate or 
irregular funds, lack of reporting tools, political interference (politician prefer eye-catching 
activities and disregard other programs that do not give political mileage; surveillance is not eye-
catching to the politicians leading to negative effect on surveillance) 
5.2.2.3 BUSIA 
Assessment site: county level, Busia County  
5.2.2.3.1 Surveillance system details 
The system focused on livestock disease surveillance with occasional surveillance on wildlife 
diseases. The activities included general screening of animals for Trypanosomiasis, collection of 
blood samples for analysis in the local, regional and national laboratories. There was a referral 
system in the laboratory surveillance with suspected cases of rabies, African swine fever (ASF) 
and brucellosis being referred to the regional laboratory in Eldoret or the national laboratory at 
Kabete, Nairobi. The forms filled included the Zero report for Avian Influenza 
Among the zoonotic diseases that the system handled included Rift Valley Fever (RVF), 
Leptospirosis, trypanosomiasis, Echinococcosis, rickettsiosis, rabies, brucellosis, anthrax, e. coli, 
salmonellosis(poultry), Taeniosis, Leishmaniosis, Bovine TB, Cysticercosis, Schistosomiasis, 
Dermatophylosis and Aspergilosis 
The main objective of the system was identified Detection and Identification of the prevailing 
disease conditions. The legal authority that the system relied on included Animal Diseases act, 
rabies act. It was noted that most the provisions were not being implemented.  
Reporting lines were described as; a farmer reports to the nearest Animal Health Assistant 
(AHA) in the field, who then visits the farm to do investigation and take the necessary samples to 
the laboratory. Cases like the notifiable diseases that require the attention of the Sub County 
Veterinary Officer (SCVO) are reported to SCVO who then forms a team to handle the cases. 
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The SCVO could also visit the affected farms. Samples obtained from the field are taken to the 
relevant laboratories like Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) in Kabete, Welcome-Trust 
laboratory and Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI) laboratory. Samples are transferred 
to the laboratory accompanied with LB1 forms. The transfer of samples and the LB 1 forms by 
the SCVO is done without necessarily passing through the County Director of Veterinary 
Services (CDVS) office. Results from the laboratory are transmitted to the SCVO who files a 
report to be forwarded to the CDVS. The SCVO reports to the CDVS and the Director of 
Veterinary Services (DVS) at the national level. Declaration of quarantine is done upon receipt 
of the laboratory results. Only confirmed results are shared with the affected farmers or 
individuals through the officers who initiated the investigations. Any cases that are to be 
involving human beings like cases of T. brucei, are reported to KEMRI for further investigation 
Figure 4 Data flow at the county level, Busia County, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The population under surveillance was reported to be all the animals in the county. The data was 
being collected on daily basis. The type information collected included herd population, 
morbidity, animal ownership, vaccination status of animals, movement of animals, reasons for 
animal movement. Data sources included farmers, herdsmen, local elders, records, and officers 
in the field, neighbours, vaccination certificates and branding marks. Transfer of data was being 
done through monthly reports and laboratory forms. Data was stored in hard (paper) copies in 
files. Electronic form of data was being stored in desk top computer. Data analysis was not being 
done. Dissemination of data was being done on need basis to the stakeholders and users of 
surveillance system like the AHA’s. Dissemination to community was done through the local 
administration officers, meetings and schools. Dissemination to the partners or donors is done 
through meetings and reports. 
Funding of surveillance activities was being done by the county government though it was 
reported to be inconsistent. Other sources of funding included ILRI and other researchers. The 
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was reported to be the ideal in order to have officer at the ward level. There were seven officers 
manning livestock markets and auction rings in the seven sub counties. There was no specific 
infrastructure set aside for surveillance activities. Most of the resources were shared with other 
disease management activities in the county. 
Document describing the disease surveillance system was not available. 
The county veterinary services had no computerized system of data handling and processing 
5.2.2.3.2 Surveillance system attributes  
There was information sharing with other laboratories but no integrated system of surveillance 
with other surveillance systems. To ensure data security the system allowed information in the 
desk top computer to be accessed by persons with the relevant passwords. The system was able 
to detect diseases in a timely manner, provide estimates of morbidity and mortality, detect trends 
and permit assessment of the effect of prevention and control programs. It could also lead to 
improved practices and stimulate research. No part of the system was identified as unnecessarily 
complicated though political interference was reported to be hampering disease surveillance 
activities. 
The system was not able to adapt to changes and new challenges due to lack of protocols to be 
followed and unequal treatment of officers. Lack of continuity of surveillance activities was also 
identified as a hindrance to adaptation to challenges. 
6.0. RESULTS - Focused Group Discussions 
All the participants in the FGD’s understood what the discussion was all about and there was 
consensus that the evaluation of disease surveillance systems in Kenya was a noble idea since it 
was expected to;  
1.  identify what is in existence  
2. do a reality check of the systems, compare notes and rectify where necessary  
3. check if the systems are up-to-date   
4. estimate how people are affected by diseases 
5. evaluate disease trends 
6. determine how far we have come and where we are going with surveillance  
7. identify problems facing the systems and measures to address them  
8. Identify the gaps in the system.   
The following themes came out of the FGD’s conducted in the counties of Busia, Bungoma and 
Kakamega 
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6.1 Surveillance system description 
Majority of the participants were able to describe the surveillance systems in their areas of 
operation. The Animal Health Practitioners performed surveillance activities during ante mortem 
and post-mortem inspections at slaughter houses, during farm visits, during inspection of stock 
routes and when issuing movement permits at livestock markets and livestock auction rings. The 
documents that the veterinary staff used included PP1 forms in the slaughter houses, ND1 and 
Zero reports for notifiable disease, condemnation certificates that indicate what caused the 
condemnation, LB1 forms used in the laboratory. 
The Human Health Practitioners used the District Health Information System (DHIS) for data 
transfer within the system. The tools used in information transfer included registers (MOH 514), 
referral books (MOH 100) used by Community Health Volunteers, House Hold registers (MOH 
513) used by CHV’s, service delivery log book (MOH514), Summary by Community Health 
Extension Workers (MOH 515), Community chalk board (MOH 516) and monthly report form 
(MOH 708) 
A few of the participants could identify the name of the systems they were using. Some 
participants from the human health sector were able to identify and describe the DHIS and the 
IDSR systems used in the surveillance of diseases in the ministry of health. 
The participants knew the uses of surveillance systems with majority identifying the following as 
uses of surveillance systems; 
1. Monitor trends of disease occurrences 
2. Quality Assurance 
3. Disease prevention and control 
4. Prompt reporting of epidemics 
5. Determine the burden of diseases 
6. Create awareness, knowledge and research opportunities 
7. Data collection and dissemination 
8. Source for funding 
9. Decision making and planning 
10. Evaluation of control strategies 
Information flow within the human health disease surveillance system was described as starting 
at the individual household level then to the community unit made of several households. 
Individuals report to village elders and administration officers at the community level. Some 
individuals report directly to the nearest health care facility (HCF). At the community level the 
CHV collects information from the village (households) that is then forwarded to the CHEW. 
The CHV uses form MOH 513 (household register) and the CHEW uses form MOH 517 
(summary tool) at the community level. The CHEW and CHV works in collaboration with the 
Community Health Committee (CHC). Each CHV is in charge of several community units while 
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the CHEW is in charge of several CHV’s and is attached to a health care facility. The CHEW 
forwards the filled MOH 517 to in-charge of the health care facility. Data from the community 
and the facilities are collected and forwarded to the Sub County Health Record Officer at the 
county level by the CHEW’s on weekly basis using form MOH 505. The SCHRO then collates 
the information from various CHEW’s then enters it into the DHIS. Data from sub county level 
health facilities normally contain laboratory confirmed diagnoses which accompany the report 
that is entered into the DHIS. The sub county level facilities have access to the DHIS and can 
enter data into the DHIS and access information in the DHIS without going through the SCHRO. 
Data is entered into the DHIS on a weekly basis. Information in the DHIS can be viewed online 
by anyone with right of access to the system. 
Figure 5: Information flow at the county level human health services, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Animal Disease Surveillance system, the participants described the flow of information to 
be starting at the Farm level where individual farmers report cases to the Animal Health 
Assistants (AHA’s) and Meat Inspectors (MI) employed by the Government. The AHA’s also 
visit farms to do disease surveillance. Cases reported to the AHA are recorded in the rumour 
registers, and then investigations including visits to affected area are conducted to confirm the 
existence of the reported disease. In the absence of the AHA’s the farmers report to the private 
animal health service providers (PAHSP’s), the local administration, local laboratories or the Sub 
County Veterinary Officer (SCVO). It was expected that the PAHSP’s should be reporting to the 
AHA’s then the AHA’s to the SCVO and the SCVO reporting to the County Director of 
Veterinary Services (CDVS) and the national Director of Veterinary Services (DVS) on a regular 
basis but there was consensus among the participants that most of the PAHSP’s do not report 
cases they do encounter to the government officers as expected. The dis-connect between the 
CHEW in charge of CHV’s in 
the community 
CHV in charge of community 
units made of villages in the 
community 
Health care facility 
(HCF), Laboratory 
Sub County Health 
Records Information 
Officer, SCDSC 
Individuals/Individual 
households at community 
level 
DHIS 
Sub county public 
health officer, Sub 
county health 
management 
committee 
County Public Health 
Officer  
 52 
 
PAHSP’s and the government officers was attributed to inadequate number of officers in the 
field and lack of commitment from the PAHSP’s. Some participants stated that some farmers 
report cases to unqualified Animal Health Service Providers (AHSP’s) who do not report the 
cases to the AHA’s or SCVO.   
Figure 6: Information flow at the county level, Western Kenya 2015 
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Less than half of participants were able to define case definition as a set of criteria used to 
classify diseases. Most of the participants referred to case definition as clinical signs or 
behavioral changes used in disease identification. Very few of the participants could give case 
definitions of the zoonotic diseases identified during the FGD’s. In addition, most participants 
reported that there were no charts or information at their areas of operations that provided case 
definitions and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) for the identified zoonotic diseases.  
The discussants were in agreement that there was neither specific surveillance system nor 
specific surveillance tools for zoonotic diseases at the counties and that the existing tools used in 
disease surveillance did not cater for zoonotic diseases adequately. 
6.3 Interaction and information Sharing 
Information generated from the system is shared with stakeholder at various levels of the 
surveillance systems. The stakeholders that were identified by the Human health practitioners 
included patients, local administration, the media, District Surveillance Committees, community 
focal persons and community members. 
Among the stakeholders identified by the animal health practitioners include farmers, Veterinary 
officers, community members, butcher-men and traders. 
The methods used in interacting with stakeholders include one-on-one, meetings, trainings, 
phone calls, barazas (public meetings), field days, demonstration, visits, poster (Information, 
education, communication), dialogue days, health education, social media (whatsapp), 
comcare(futuristic) and M-Learning (supported by AMREF). 
Participants reported that they give feedback to the other stakeholders and there was feedback 
from the users of the surveillance systems too. An example was given by the participants from 
the animal health where a case of a notifiable disease is reported to the AHA who then reports to 
the SCVO. The SCVO then facilitates investigations and then shares the result of the 
investigation with the AHA and the affected community and declares quarantine incase 
investigations confirm the existence of the notifiable disease in the area. The community is then 
mobilized to take part in control measures like vaccination campaign. In the human health 
services the community health committees (CHC) organizes meeting for the community units 
meet regularly (every three months) at the community level where information sharing happens. 
The CHC sets aside days for planning the agenda for the community and days for interaction 
with community called community action days when the communities also give feedback to the 
surveillance officers. 
6.4 Integrated Disease Surveillance System 
Majority of the participants did not understand what integrated disease surveillance system 
entailed. However, some participants, especially those from the human health were able to relate 
the integrated system with the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response Unit housed in the 
Ministry of Health. The participants described integrated disease surveillance system as joining 
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or merging the different systems involved in disease surveillance and making them work 
collectively. 
All the participants were in support of integrating the animal and human disease surveillance 
systems. Among the reasons given for support of integrated disease surveillance system include 
reduction of wastage of resources used in parallel systems, ease of access to information, sharing 
of resources, ease of planning, and influence policy on training and preventive services 
Several structures for disease reporting were proposed.  Most of the participants proposed that 
the community be involved comprehensively in disease surveillance activities and information 
flow should start at the community level (households, villages, sub location). It was proposed 
that the existing structures like the Community Health Committees (CHC’s) within the human 
health surveillance system be re-structured to incorporate the animal disease surveillance system. 
The CHC is made of CHV’s, CHEW’s, and the local administrators (village elders, chiefs, ward 
administrators). The participants were in agreement that health management teams could be 
formed at the health facility level, sub county level and the county level. The health management 
committee was proposed to have key stakeholders in the animal and human health services. 
Participants were in agreement that disease reporting tools for zoonotic diseases should be 
harmonized so that they incorporate both animal and human disease surveillance. 
6.5 Effect of devolution of services to the county government 
There were mixed feeling on the effect of devolution of animal and human services to the 
counties. Some participants considered it a good idea but sabotaged by poor implementation and 
political interference. Those who considered it a bad idea said that the county governments were 
not competent in provision of the services as they were known to compromise on the acceptable 
standards. 
It was generally agreed that human and animal disease surveillance systems were worse after the 
devolution compared to the pre-devolution time. The reasons given for worse scenario included 
lack of disease reporting tools, lack commodities for in the laboratories, lack of proper reporting 
structures especially in the animal disease surveillance, poor response to disease outbreaks and 
emergency situations, lack of incentives and motivation, political interference and lack of 
harmonized data collection tools. 
The participants were in agreement that there was no effective collaboration between the county 
government and the national government. Unlike previously when the staff used to get disease 
reporting tools in good time, the tools were unavailable in most parts of the counties evaluated 
pointing to lack of coordination between the national and county government since it is the 
national government that produces the reporting tools. The absence of effective collaboration had 
led to some county governments designing their own disease surveillance tools in contravention 
of the existing national and international law. This was noted by the animal health participants in 
the discussion. 
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When asked what recommendations they would give in order to improve disease surveillance in 
the counties, most participants recommended that devolution of animal and human health 
services be reversed. Other recommendations included facilitation of surveillance activities by 
provision of working tools in a timely manner, transport availability, avoidance of political 
interference, increase the number of personnel for surveillance activities, capacity building, 
coordination of animal and human disease surveillance activities, proper coordination between 
county and national government, motivation and incentives for personnel. 
7.0. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The animal disease surveillance system had inadequate infrastructure both at the national and at 
the county level. The roll out of the computerized disease surveillance system was hampered by 
inadequate personnel and equipment. The disjointed way in which the digital system was 
implemented with several methods being tried at more-or-less the same time could have led to 
confusion in the system with some parts of the county using one system and the other parts using 
different system. Collating the data from different parts of the country was found to be hampered 
by the slow pace of data transmission to the national level. The delays lead to lack of timely 
response to potential epidemics. In addition, analysis of the disjointed data may lead to unreliable 
information being shared with the stakeholders since the analysis would not be representative of 
the actual situation at the national or county level. 
Cases of under-reporting in the animal disease surveillance system could be attributed to the 
existence of unqualified animal health service providers who fail to report cases to government 
officers for fear of victimization by the government officers for engaging in veterinary practice 
in contravention of the Veterinary Surgeons and Veterinary Paraprofessional (VSVP) act. The 
lack of reporting by the unqualified AHSP’s led to loss of vital data and underreporting at the 
community level thus leading to misrepresentation of the correct disease situation in the counties 
and at the national level. It would be advisable for the players in the animal disease surveillance 
system to use the approach in the human health system where the community is involved in 
surveillance activities through community committees. 
Due to lack of closer laboratory services for the animal health service providers, majority of the 
service providers use clinical signs to make diagnosis. This coupled with lack of appropriate case 
definitions, lead to cases of misdiagnosis and generation of unreliable data. In addition, it was 
observed that most of the levels of animal health service provision lacked proper records on 
disease surveillance. 
It was not possible to get costs that were specific to the surveillance activities since the resources 
used in surveillance were shared with other disease management activities.  Preparation of 
budgets that are specific to disease surveillance is of importance for planning purposes and 
resource mobilization. The players in the animal disease surveillance should come up a 
breakdown of cost of surveillance at the county and the national levels. 
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From the results obtained it was evident that data on animal disease surveillance was scanty and 
the reporting system is not well coordinated right from the community level thus leading to 
inadequacy of the data. 
The human health disease surveillance was well organized both at the county level and at the 
national level. The use of computerized system of reporting at the sub county level and at the 
health facility level meant that information sharing was real-time and easily accessible to those 
with right of access. The organization at the community level involving the community health 
committees, community health volunteers and the community health extension workers ensured 
that the data collected was comprehensive and inclusive. 
There was minimal collaboration between animal health services and the human health service 
providers at the different level of disease surveillance due to absence of designated forums for 
collaboration between the service providers. However, it was noted that collaborations are 
normally heightened during emergency situations. 
8.0. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
None of the surveillance systems evaluated catered for zoonotic diseases adequately. There was 
no clear-cut resource allocation for surveillance activities both at the national and county levels. 
From results obtained in the evaluation exercise it was evident that there were no effective 
structures for sharing of information on disease surveillance between the animal and human 
disease surveillance at the national and at the county level. The human health disease 
surveillance was well structured at all the levels of information flow. 
The use of standard case definition and laboratory diagnosis was minimal leading to generation 
of data that may not be factual. 
It is therefore recommended that effective structures be established at all levels of disease 
surveillance with incorporation of the various systems into an integrated system that covers both 
animal and human disease surveillance. A lot can be borrowed from the existing systems in the 
human health.  
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